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LATERAL MOVEMENTS: LEGAL FLEXIBILITY AND FOREIGN
INVESTMENT REGULATION IN CHINA
Peter Howard Corne
I. INTRODUCTION
China's legal system has developed rapidly over the past fifteen
years, with lawmaking bodies at all levels issuing laws and regulations in
conveyer-belt fashion, most of which have been drawn from Western
legal models. China has pinned its future on adopting Western economic
models within a state apparatus and a political system based on socialist
ideology; and by doing this, China hopes to attract needed Western eco-
nomic linkages. Thus, a legal system acceptable to Western investors has
become a key factor in attracting this support. However, despite the
enormous strides that have been made, certain features of China's legal
structure have given investors and their legal counsel cause to complain
bitterly.
Many of these complaints relate to the uncertainty that surrounds the
drafting, enactment, and amendment of laws, regulations, and rules,' and
the significance of "internal rules" in regulation.2 Other complaints focus
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' FOREIGN INVESTMENT CONSULTANCY CORPORATION, ZHONGGUO ToUzI
HUANJINGZHONG CUNZAI DE WENTI [PROBLEMS IN RESPECT TO INVESTING IN THE
PRC] 25 (1991); Interview with Makoto Seki, Chief Representative of the Japan-China
Investment Promotion Organisation, in Beijing (May 2, 1991) [hereinafter Seki inter-
view]. For a detailed elucidation of the problems in the operation of China's legal
system, including drafting, consistency, implementation, judicial, and administrative
review and obstacles to further development, see Peter Howard Come, The System of
Administrative Law and Its Implementation in China, forthcoming by Hong Kong
University Press.
2 FOREIGN INVESTMENT CONSULTANCY CORPORATION, supra note 1, at 25. It
should be noted that China is making an effort to publish more regulations that relate
to foreign trade in response to its undertakings under the U.S.-CHINA MEMORANDUM
OF UNDERSTANDING ON MARKEr AccEss (1993). With this effort, China has undertaken
a dismantling of its complex system of non-tariff barriers, including import license re-
quirements and quotas, making its trade regime more transparent, and improving its
chances of becoming a founding member of the World Trade Organisation. See CHINA
L. & PRAC., Jan. 23, 1992, at 4-9; CHiNA L. & PRAC., April 9, 1992, at 7-12; CHINA
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on the vagueness of many of the laws,3 the vast discretionary power to
interpret conferred on administrative authorities,4 and the law's inherent
changeability in China.' In particular, mention is made commonly about
legal inconsistencies between central and local law and differences in
legal interpretation and administrative directives issued.6 Transparency and
lack of predictability in administrative decision making, particularly in
relation to the conferring of licenses7 is another aspect that often is
brought up in the literature,8 as is the confusion and inefficiency caused
by bureaucratic rivalry and the overlapping of departmental jurisdiction,9
not to mention the associated problems of protectionism and favouritism
in implementation of law," and interference in management autonomy."
The reason for many of these features can be found in the flexible
and broad nature of law in the People's Republic of China (PRC). As a
consequence, law is susceptible to interpretation and reinterpretation as it
is implemented by administrative bodies.' Administrative organs and
L. & PRAC., July 19, 1992, at 8-12; The Australian, October 13, 1993, at 40.
3 FOREIGN INVESTMENT CONSULTANCY CORPORATION, supra note 1, at 13, 16.
4 Id. at 16.
5 Id. at 26.
6 Id. at 4 (customs regulation), 21 (tax), 25; Seki interview, supra, note 1; U.S.-
China Business Council, U.S. INVESTMENT IN CHINA 66 (1990).
7 FOREIGN INVESTMENT CONSULTANCY CORPORATION, supra note 1, at 23.
8 Id. at 26.
9 Id. at 9.
10 Id. at 3, 27. See generally Lee M. Zeichner, Chinese Solutions to Legal
Problems: Repatriating Business Profits from the PRC, 19 LAw AND POL'Y INT'L Bus.,
385, 394-96, 401-09 (1987) (exploring the difficulties that joint ventures have establish-
ing business in the People's Republic of China).
FOREIGN INVESTMENT CONSULTANCY CORPORATION, supra note 1, at 4.
2 A case in point is the Beijing New Century Hotel. When its joint venture
contract was negotiated in mid-1986, there was no hint of the new charges that would
be imposed by administrative authorities. These charges were neither created by the en-
actment or the amendment of the law, nor even by new administrative rules or
regulations-they were imposed by a round of "circulars" issued by administrative
bodies in late 1986.
In October 1986 the State Council issued a circular requiring major electricity users to
purchase electricity bonds, at 1000 yuan per kilowatt, in proportion to the number of
kilowatts consumed per day.... Another State Council circular, issued the following
October, stipulated that electricity users who failed to comply with the October 1986
requirement would be required to pay for their electricity at double the rate for bond
buyers.
Satoshi Imai, Case Studies of Joint Ventures in China (VI), 80 CHINA NEwsLmrETTER 18,
21 (1989). In addition, a Beijing municipality notification of November, 1986 stipulated
that users of the four utilities (siyuan)--cold and hot water, gas, and sewerage-should
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their officials can ultimately apply an altered set of norms under the guise
of implementing the law enacted by the higher authority. Officials are in
effect released from strictly applying new and unfamiliar legal norms -
norms that may provide guarantees designed to attract foreign invest-
ment. 3
Implementation in this sense takes place in two stages, the first being
the issue of implementing regulations, rules, and lower normative docu-
ments; and the second being "actual implementation" that takes place at
the level of the law in action. This Article discusses the operation of
China's legal system at the first level of implementation, and illustrates
the systemic features the resulting scheme in the ultimate application of
norms that are rather different than those expressed on the face of
enacting law. An understanding of this process can contribute to the
success of foreign investment enterprises in the China market.
The resulting gap between law on its face and the norms that are
actually applied is substantial. A fiction is created - an illusion that
these laws are the actual reference by which regulation is conducted. As
a result, there exists a difference in legal expectations between govern-
ment officials and foreign investors. The law is familiar enough on its
face to attract investment, and loose enough to allow the continued
application of another set of normative values more familiar to officials
charged with actual regulation.
This Article first sets out the elements of legal flexibility built into
legal enactments. It will then show how specificity is introduced into
Chinese law through the issue of implementing rules, circulars, and
interpretations, both at the central and at various local levels. These docu-
ments contain substantive provisions which have been altered at will by
administrative bodies with little regard to the actual spirit behind their
enacting law. The example of foreign investment enterprise labour autono-
my provisions will be used to illustrate this process. It will be shown that
administrative agencies have a broad mandate to determine the actual
content of the implementing regulations, rules, and interpretations that
shoulder the development costs. These in total added a further $5.16 million to the
New Century's costs, upsetting targets anticipated in the initial feasibility study and de-
pressing profitability. Id.
"3 This phenomenon was illustrated in a U.S.-China Business Council report in
1990. According to the Council, internal rules were issued in 1989 that authorised local
labour offices to play a more active role determining wages that foreign investment
enterprises pay to local employees, and to control "unjustified wages," despite Article
15 of the State Council Encouragement of Foreign Investment Provisions (1986) provid-
ing for such enterprises to autonomously set wage standards. U.S.-CHINA BusINESs
CouNciL, supra note 6, at 65.
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they issue in the course of their regulatory activity. The result is that
apparent contradictions are tolerated in the name of flexibility.
II. LAWMAKING AND DIsCRETION
As a rule, a more precise law is likely to be more effectively
implemented. Precision minimizes wrongdoing at the level of the law in
action. In China, however, laws are broadly drafted with much discretion
left to implementing authorities. The laws are expressed in terms of
general standards which fail to deal with obvious problems of implemen-
tation. Real clarity exists only at the level of administrative rules and
circulars. These documents are issued by the implementing authority.
Such documents are not necessarily published and are inherently change-
able, subject as they are to the whims of agency officials.
In the drafting of law, the PRC is wrestling with a contradiction of
sorts. Amplification of law with greater detail and more deftly tailored
regulations would assist the PRC's economic development in the long run
as it increases certainty, thus further encouraging market rational
behaviour on the part of entrepreneurs.14 However, in the short run,
detailed law limits the flexibility that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
currently enjoys in its ability to respond (by means of policy directives)
to rapid political and economic change. The current attitude towards
lawmaking favours short-term flexibility and the advantages of vagueness
over long-term considerations." This is particularly true in the case of
regulatory law for which adaptability is upheld as a meritorious feature.'6
Consequently, most economic law in China is meant only to brush stroke
basic policy, allowing any problems that arise to be solved on a case-by-
case basis by the government.
The Chinese have adopted a rationale that lends itself to the creation
of law that is inherently flexible so that it may be adjusted according to
the vagaries of human behaviour. Such laws allow for wide variation in
14 MAX WEBER, WiRTSCHAFr UND GEsELLSCHAFr [LAw IN ECONOMY AND
SOCIETY] (Max Rheinstein ed., Max Rheinstein & Edward Shils trans., Harvard
University Press, 1966) (1925).
"5 David Zweig et al., Law, Contracts and Economic Modernisation: Lessons from
Recent Chinese Rural Reforms, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 319, 326-27 (1987).
16 XINGZHENG JIGUAN XINGZHENG ZRIFA YU YINGSU ZHIsIE DAQUAN,
[ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLEMENTATION AND LAwsuITs CONCERNING
ADMINISTRATIVE AuTHORrrIEs] 7 (Luo Yu Zhen ed., China University of Politics and
Law Press, 1990) [hereinafter Luo]. An example of a codified administrative law is
Germany's Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz [Federal Administrative Procedural Act, 1976]
1976 Bundesgesetzblatt, Tiel I [BGBI. 1] 1253. See, e.g., NIGEL FOSTER, GERMAN LAW
& LEGAL SYSTEM 128 (1993).
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application as they are customarily expressed as general principles
(yuanze). Chinese jurists such as Chen Shouyi take this understanding of
law as consistent with socialism which considers law as part of the
superstructure of society. When economic relations change, law should
change as well:
Socialist law must develop and change in accordance with the develop-
ment and change of economical, political, cultural and other conditions.
This kind of change is embodied in the legislative process, where, in
order to adapt to the objective needs of development, the process of en-
actment, revision and abrogation of laws and regulations is continuously
undertaken (italics added).'7
This provides a rationale for vaguely written, broad laws that allow
wide variation in application-a rationale reflected in the statements of
government leaders. For example, Wang Hanbin, when he was Director
of the Law Committee to the National People's Congress (NPC) in 1985,
said that "law should not be too specific lest it tie our hands and feet in
the face of the rapidly changing situation."'8
China has opted for a legal system that is in essence as fluid and
changeable as the economy and society which it is supposed to regulate.
Consequently, the informal aspects of regulatory rules change as rapidly
as the government's economic policy. A corollary is that laws are inten-
tionally made ambiguous to enable flexibility in interpretation and im-
plementation. No obstacles impede such practices-there is no concept, as
exists in some Western legal systems, that law or delegated legislation
can be struck down on the basis of uncertainty.
A. Hierarchy of Legislative Authority
The PRC is a unitary, not federated, state power. All major legisla-
tion comes from the central power organs. In a unitary system, the
authority of local governments comes entirely from the central govern-
ment and this authority may be, in theory, changed or withdrawn by the
central government. In contrast, the central and local governments in a
federal system have their respective authorities well-defined in a con-
stitution which cannot be amended without the consent of the majority of
'" FAXUE JICHU L..uN [Basic Theory of Jurisprudence] 350 (1984), cited in Yu
Xingzhong, Legal Pragmatism in the P.R.C., 3 J. CHNEsE L. 29, 43 (1989). See also
Tao-tai Hsia & Constance A. Johnson, Lawmaking in China - Part III, E. AsIAN EXEC.
REP., June 1987, at 10.
" Gao Xi-Ching, Today's Legal Thinking and its Economic Impact in China in the
Emerging Framework of Chinese Civil Law, 52 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 113 (1989).
1995]
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the constituent units of the federation. Because of China's size and
diversity, local legislation is, however, permitted although it is officially
(but not necessarily always in practice) limited in scope.
There are two types of organs in China that are empowered to make
legislative enactments. The first are referred to as state power organs
(guojia qianli jiguan) - China's legislatures - which take their form as
the National People's Congress (NPC), its standing committee, and local
people's congresses and their standing committees of provinces, munici-
palities, 9 and "quite big cities"' designated by the State Council. Cer-
tain administrative organs (xingzheng jiguan), that is, the State Council,
its departments, and commissions, and local people's governments at the
same level as the local people's congresses mentioned above, also have
the power to make rules.
The NPC and its standing committee issues various enactments that
can loosely be categorized as "law." The supreme administrative organ,
the State Council, issues a variety of documents known as "administrative
regulations" (xingzheng fagui). The organs under the State Council, on the
other hand, issue what are known as administrative rules (xingzheng
guizhang). Local people's congresses issue local administrative regulations
(difang xingzheng fagui) and local people's governments of provinces,
municipalities, and "quite big cities"' may issue local administrative
rules (difang xingzheng guizhang). According to the Administrative
Litigation Law,' all the above enactments, with the exception of admin-
"' The three autonomous municipalities are Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai. ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE DISIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 2 (1980).
20 In 1984, the State Council approved 26 "quite big cities" (jiaoda de shi), all of
which had populations of between 500,000 and one million. See Epstein, China and
Hong Kong: Law, Ideology and the Future Interaction of the Legal Systems, in THE
FUTURE OF THE LAW IN HONG KONG 37, at 58 (R. Wacks ed., 1989) (citing SIMPLi-
FIED HANDBOOK OF PRC ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS [ZHoNGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO
XINGZHENG QUHUA JIANCE] 149 (Beijing Cartographic Press, 1985)). The power to
approve new administrative divisions was in 1985 devolved to provincial government.
Id.
2' There is no formal definition of "quite big city." Id.
Administrative Litigation Law of the PRC, art. 53 (promulgated April 4, 1989)
[hereinafter Administrative Litigation Law]. An English translation is available in 5
CHINA L. & PRACTICE 37 (1989).
Administrative Litigation Law, art. 53 (1989), provides:
People's Courts hearing administrative cases shall refer to rules enacted and
promulgated by ministries and commissions under the State Council . . . and rules
enacted and promulgated by the people's governments of the provinces, autonomous
regions and centrally administered cities, the people's governments of the municipalities
wherein are located the provincial or autonomous region people's governments, and the
people's governments of relatively large municipalities approved by the State Council.
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istrative rules, are legally enforceable if published. The court has dis-
cretion whether or not to apply administrative rules issued by local or
national administrative organs. Other normative documents (qita de
guifangxing wenjian) formulated by national or local administrative organs
for the purpose of regulation are not enforceable as law.
B. Characteristics of Legal Drafting
Legal flexibility can be illustrated by an examination of the charac-
teristics of legal drafting in Chinese law. In China, legal drafting is
characterised by the following:
" Principle-like pronouncements
" Vagueness and ambiguity
" Broadly worded discretions
" Undefined terms
" Omissions
" General catch-all clauses
At the level of basic law and statutes, legislation is customarily
written in an ambiguous fashion in the form of principle-like pronounce-
ments, intended, to provide only a thumbnail sketch of the parameters of
regulation.
C. Lateral Movements
Legislation issued by administrative organs is in theory subordinate
and complimentary to that issued by state power organs.' All enact-
ments of administrative organs must not conflict with the Constitution or
law and the supreme power organs (except local difang quanli jiguan)
can annul them if they do so. Inappropriate (bushidang) administrative
rules (guizhang) issued by administrative bodies can be revoked by
supreme power organs at the same or higher level, and administrative
organs that are superior to the enacting authority in the same administra-
tive jurisdiction (xitong).24 Local people's governments also must ensure
that their enactments comply with those issued by the State Council and
In cases where a People's Court considers a set of rules enacted and promulgated
by a local people's government to be inconsistent with a set of rules enacted and
promulgated by the State Council or there is an inconsistency among rules enacted and
promulgated by the ministries and commissions under the State Council. The Supreme
People's Court shall submit such rules to the State Council for a ruling.
Luo, supra note 16, at 71.
2 Id. at 68.
24 Id.
2531995)
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its subordinate departments, as well as with the Constitution. Concepts of
legislative consistency in the PRC are not strict,25 and courts do not
have the power to declare inconsistent rules invalid, although they reserve
the power to refrain from applying administrative rules (guizhang) that
conflict with other enactments. 6
Regulations (xingzheng fagui) that are issued to implement statutes
and basic law are enacted to add some detail to many of the matters left
outstanding by the higher law. However, they too almost invariably
exhibit the features listed above, especially in controversial areas.
Xingzheng fagui that are issued by the State Council pursuant to its
general authorization from the NPC to make legislation concerning regula-
tion of the economy also tend to exhibit the above features, as do lower-
level rules (guizhang) enacted by State Council departments and local
governments. Although it has been pointed out that the style of lawmak-
ing in the economic area, particularly in the foreign economic area, is
less ideological and more concrete than other types of laws. This is only
a matter of degree and has by no means precluded foreign economic
legislation from exhibiting the features listed.
1. Principle-like Pronouncements
China legal specialist Timothy A. Gelatt wrote in 1989 of the "now
almost ten year tradition of PRC foreign economic statutes [of] painting
a broad outline and leaving many issues unanswered."27 The Cooperative
Joint Venture Law' illustrates this tradition at work.
The Cooperative Joint Venture Law, described as "a vague broad
statute that leaves many questions unanswered,"29 clearly exhibits a
principle-like nature. For example, Article 5 refers to application proce-
2 See, e.g., Ying Songnian & Dong Hao, A Study of the Applicable Laws in Ad-
ministrative Reconsideration, in THE ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGATION LAW OF THE PRC:
CHANGING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE COURTS AND ADMINIsTRATIvE AGENCIES IN
CHINA (Pittman B. Potter ed., 1991).
26 Administrative Litigation Law, supra note 22.
2 Timothy A. Gelatt, China's New Co-operative Joint Venture Law, 15 SYRACUSE
J. INT'L L. & COM., 187, 200-01.
' Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint
Ventures, art. 20 (promulgated Apr. 13, 1988). An English translation appears in 1
LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLES' REPUBLIC OF CHINA GOVERNING FOREIGN-
RELATED MATTERS 509 (Bureau of Legislative Affairs of the State Council of the
People's Republic of China eds., 1991) [hereinafter Cooperative Joint Venture Law].
9 Jerome A. Cohen, The Long Awaited Co-operative Joint Venture Law, in LAW
IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: COMMENTARY, READINGS AND MATERIALS, 777
(Ralph H. Folsom and John H. Minan eds., 1989).
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dures and approval of contracts by an approval authority, but does not
specify who the authority is and whether there is more than one authori-
ty. Another example is the vague article that originally appeared in the
Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprise Law (1986) that provides for the
possibility of assistance in the case of foreign exchange imbalance is
repeated.' The taxation code "is a model of vagueness,"' providing
that "a contractual joint venture shall, in accordance with state provisions
on tax, pay taxes and may enjoy the preferential treatment of tax reduc-
tion or exemption."32
The law tacitly confirms that cooperative joint ventures may take two
different forms by providing that "a contractual joint venture which meets
the conditions for being considered a legal person under Chinese law,
shall acquire the status of a Chinese legal person in accordance with the
law,"33 but provides no guidance on how the parties to a cooperative
venture will be treated as a separate entity. It also does not address, and
therefore leaves open, the question of limited liability of investors.34
Similar gaps exist in the area of early recovery of investment from the
cooperative venture.
Article 24, which provides for expiration or termination of a joint
venture contract, is vague on what sort of legal procedures should be fol-
lowed. Article 22, though it attempts to protect creditors of the joint
venture by providing that "the Chinese and foreign cooperative venturers
shall, in accordance with the provision of relevant laws and agreements
in the joint venture contract, assume responsibility for the liabilities of the
cooperative venture," offers no clue as to how the drafters intend for this
problem to be solved.36 Moreover, like the Law on Wholly Owned
Foreign Enterprises before it, the Cooperative Joint Venture Law indicates
that ventures are expected to have a fixed term without providing any
guidelines on what are acceptable periods.37
Examples of other features of Chinese legal drafting mentioned
above are drawn from statutes, regulations, and rules and are categorized
below.
2. Vagueness and Ambiguity
Cooperative Joint Venture Law, supra note 28.
31 Gelatt, supra note 27, at 196.
32 Cooperative Joint Venture Law, supra note 30, at art 21.
33 Id. at art. 2.
Gelatt, supra note 27, at 193.
s Cooperative Joint Venture Law, supra note 28, at art. 22.
36 Gelatt, supra note 27, at 199.
Cooperative Joint Venture Law, supra note 28, at art. 25; Gelatt, supra note 27,
at 200.
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This is a feature that effectively grants the implementing authority
the power to determine legal meaning itself through subservient enact-
ments, formal legislative interpretation, or in ad hoc case-by-case interpre-
tations. For example, the Certain Provisions on Contributions by the
Parties to Chinese Foreign Equity Joint Ventures,38 although requiring all
joint venture contracts to state clearly the time limits for the parties to
make contributions to registered capital, leaves the term "time limits"
unexplained, failing to provide even some modification with words such
as "reasonable" or "limited to cash contributions."
Another example is the unclear meaning of "limited liability" under
the Equity Joint Venture Law39 which provides that parties must bear
risks and losses in proportion to their contribution of registered capital
without providing any limit on the actual liability of each party.
The Administration of Enterprise Legal Person Regulations (1988)
provides in Article 6 that the authorities in charge of registration shall
develop, in a planned way, the service of providing information on enter-
prise legal person registration. The breadth of Article 6 has meant that it
does not constitute sufficient legal basis for an interested party to demand
that information be produced, thus effectively leaving the availability of
information dependent on the state of the local State Administration of
Industry and Commerce files and the mood of the official to whom the
request is made.'
Similarly, the Foreign Income Tax Law Implementing Rules4
provide that a new venture's preparatory and start-up expenses are deduct-
ible from the time it has been approved to prepare to start up
3 Capital Contributions by Parties to Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures Provisions
(promulgated by Ministry of Foreign Relations and Trade (MOFERT) Mar. 1, 1988),
reprinted in 2 CHINA L. & PRAC. 43 (1988).
39 THE LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON JOINT VENTURES USING
CHINESE AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT, art. 4 (1979). An English translation is available
in COMMERCIAL, BusINEss AND TRADE LAWS 51-52 (Owen D. Nee, Jr. et al. eds.,
1989).
' Denny F. Wong & Christopher G. Oechsli, Getting a Binding Contract: Legal
Status and Authority of Chinese Enterprises and their Representatives: How Foreigners
Can Determine Who They are Dealing With, E. ASIAN ExEc. REP., Jan. 15, 1989, at
10-11.
" Income Tax Law Concerning Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Foreign
Enterprises Implementing Rules, art. 80 (promulgated Apr. 16, 1991) reprinted in 7
CHINA L. & PRAC. 16 (1991).
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(lixiangshu)42 to the time a business license is issued,43 depending on
the whim of the implementing authority.
The State Council Regulations concerning the Balance of Foreign
Exchange Measures and Expenditures by Sino-Foreign Joint Equity
Ventures (1986) - to the extent that their vagueness permits accurate
understanding' - offered the possibility of relief to foreign investment
enterprises suffering foreign exchange imbalances, but did not promise
any early resolution to the problem. Article 5, for example, offered the
possibility of import substitution without casting any new light on how it
was to proceed, "other than to indicate that the foreign exchange required
for the purchase was to be authorised by the approved foreign exchange
plans of the end users."'45
3. Undefined Terms
Chinese lawmakers also tend to leave crucial terms undefined which
produces a great amount of discretion for implementing authorities to
interpret these terms as they see fit. For example, in the Ministry of
Foreign Relations and Trade (MOFERT, as it then was known) Measures
for Foreign Investment Enterprises Purchasing Domestic Products for
Export to Achieve a Balance of Foreign Exchange Income and Expendi-
ture (1987), Article 2 provides that the use of reminbi profits should be
restricted to enterprises that have run into temporary difficulties in this
regard to be applied within "a certain period of time." The measures do
not define what is meant by temporary difficulties or what is an allow-
able period of time.
Article 5 of the Provisional Measures for Control of Foreign Ex-
change Guarantees by Organisations Within China (1986), now superseded
by Administrative Measures on the Issue of Foreign Exchange Guarantees
to Foreign Parties by Domestic Institutions (1991), was a classic example.
It stated that guarantees shall not be provided for foreign organisations or
enterprises with foreign investment unless foreign exchange assets are
equal in value to the amount of the loan provided as collateral. "Chinese
enterprises established abroad," "foreign organisations," "enterprises with
The lixiangshu is the "preliminary project approval that sets the stage for detailed
negotiations on an investment deal ... ." Timothy A. Gelatt, Foreign Business Tax
Law: New Implementing Rules, E. ASIAN EXEC. REP., Sept. 15, 1991, at 9, 11.
4 Id. at 11.
' Jerome Alan Cohen & Stuart J. Valentine, Recent Chinese Legislation Assisting
Foreign Investors to Solve Their Hard Currency Problem: Import Substitution and
Other Options, 3 B.Y.U. L. REV. 519, 533 (1988).
4 Id. at 535.
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foreign investment," and "foreign exchange assets" are not defined
anywhere. The term "foreign exchange assets" raised the issue as to
whether it "refers only to foreign currency securities and assets which can
be readily converted into foreign exchange (for example, equipment or a
physical asset in the form of a building), thereby excluding intangible
interests or choses in action."' This decision rested with the State Ad-
ministration of Exchange Control (SAEC), the authority charged with im-
plementation and interpretation of the Measures.
More recent legislation also exhibits this feature. The PRC Enterprise
with Foreign Investment Income Tax Law Implementing Rules provide
that profits must be invested in a new enterprise "directly" after being
distributed in order to qualify for a tax refund. The concept of "directly"
is left undefined, therefore, rendering it uncertain how long an investor
must wait before a tax refund can be issued.47
One can cite an endless list of other examples of undefined terms,
some of which are: "leading cadres" in the Strict Control of Leading
Cadre Provisions; "advanced technology" in regard to the stipulation that
imported technology must be advanced and appropriate under the Tech-
nology Import Regulations; "major and complex cases" that must be
decided by higher people's courts under the Administrative Litigation
Law; "sophisticated products," "advanced or key technology," and "inter-
nationally competitive" as prerequisites for preferential treatment under the
Foreign Exchange Balancing Regulations; the "quite big cities" that are
invested with lawmaking power under the Local Organic Law; "adminis-
trative organs" under the Administrative Litigation Law; and the term
"especially serious cases" under the Criminal Code.
4. Broadly Worded Discretions
Discretion is an integral part of Chinese administrative law, as one
would expect in a situation in which administrative authorities have such
an important role in drafting the rules that they are going to implement.
Even fairly detailed rules are subject to considerable uncertainty because
they are often subject to overriding ministerial or departmental discretion.
This is particularly evident in the laws relating to foreign investment,
where according to the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Coopera-
tion (MOFTEC), the establishment of a foreign investment enterprise is
subject to the approval of MOFERT or a local foreign trade bureau, the
' Jack C. Young, Foreign Exchange Guarantee: A Chinese Puzzle, INT'L FIN. L.
REV. 26, 28 (1988).
' See supra note 41, art. 80; Gelatt, Foreign Business Tax Law, supra note 42, at
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main criteria for approval being drawn from the priorities of the current
state plan. Certain phrases build into the law a discretionary authority for
determining which foreign investment enterprises may take advantage of
the provisions.
It is hardly surprising where the administration occupies a singular
or dominant role in initiating and drafting that there is a pronounced
tendency to grant powers to the same agency in extremely wide terms. It
is in the interests of an implementing authority for discretionary powers
to be drafted as broadly as possible, especially, as is the case in China,
where the implementing body is also entitled to issue secondary rules
pursuant to its inherent law-making power (zhiquan),4 and where it has
the power to issue its own official interpretations of the law. However,
broad discretionary powers by nature create uncertainty, as those for
whom a legislative command is addressed may not know what is expect-
ed of them. They also violate the legal ideal of equality as a standard
applied to one may not be applied to others in similar circumstances.
Moreover, they violate the principle of legislative purpose, as they permit
agencies to substitute different goals than those originally contemplated as
long as it is a possible interpretation of the legislation.49
Discretionary powers are normally expressed in broad terms and are
unenumerated. The inclusion of a clause such as that which appears in
Article 18 of the Provisional Regulations of Shanghai Municipal People's
government on Reminbi Loans Secured by Mortgages (1988), that a loan
contract is to be notarized "if necessary," is not at all uncommon. Other
provisions implicitly grant a discretionary license to a government authori-
ty for administrative interference, as demonstrated by Article 19 of the
Shanghai Liquidation Provisions which give the approval authority the
right to have its officers participate in liquidation meetings or adopt other
' Two forms of lawmaking power exercisable by administrative authorities are
recognized in the PRC. Legislative power which is vested in an administrative body by
virtue of either the Constitution or an organic law is known in China as zhiquan Ifa.
This can be described as legislative power within a specific mandate that arises from
a body's natural or inherent powers of office. The second form of lawmaking power
is shouquan ifa which is a power to enact legislation that has been specifically
conferred on a body, usually an administrative body, by a higher legislative authority.
Lawmaking pursuant to zhiquan is considered an intrinsic function of administrative
bodies. One example of such a power is Article 89 of the Constitution which vests in
the State Council the power to enact administrative regulations (xingzheng fagui) in
accordance with the Constitution and laws. Article 89 empowers the State Council in
effect to enact any regulation necessary to implement law and to direct administrative
work. All such enactments are made pursuant to the State Council's inherent powers
of office. Luo, supra note 16, at 69-70.
41 Ross CRANSTON, LAW, GOvERNMENT AND PUBLIC PoLIcY, 23 (1987).
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necessary measures to supervise liquidation procedures.
Corporate taxes is an example of an area in which discretionary
treatment is entrenched. This is because Chinese tax legislation expressly
gives a broad measure of discretion to local tax authorities, especially in
regard to the granting of exemptions and privileges 0 or to the authoriz-
ing of alternate methods of computing profits5" and depreciation of fixed
assets.52 As a result, there is a tendency to regard the legislation as a
flexible guideline to be used by local tax authorities in negotiating a
dispute," or even to negotiate tax packages before a project has com-
menced. 4 Needless to say, this has resulted in great disparities in tax
rulings from one province to another.
5. Omissions
Glaring omissions in regard to, for example, time periods, indicate a
lack of consensus which will be settled in the interim by the implement-
ing authority. Other omissions, such as lack of specification of other
applicable or relevant law, often are an admission that some aspect of the
area may be regulated by merely internal directives and that formal legal
regulation does not as yet exist.
Article 3 of the Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Terms Tentative
Provisions," which refers to "any other state law or regulation which
requires that joint venture terms be fixed," was probably included to give
flexibility to limit particular industries in the future.56 Similarly, the
Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprise (WFOE) Law Implementing Provisions,
in regard to financial affairs and accounting, only refers to "relevant
Chinese laws and regulations" even though no set of regulations in this
area applying to WFOEs existed at the time. Exactly the same approach
is taken in the same regulations toward employees and trade unions even
o Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China for Enterprises with Foreign
Investment and Foreign Enterprises, art. 11 (1991). An English translation is available
at 2 REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA GOVERNING FOREIGN-
RELATED MATrERS, 946-48 (Bureau of Legislative Affairs of the State Council of the
People's Republic of China ed., 1991).
s' Income Tax Law of the PRC Concerning Foreign Investment Enterprises and
Foreign Enterprises Implementing Rules, supra note 41, art. 16.
52 Id. at art. 31-34; JINYAN LI, TAxATION IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 35,
40-41.
5' LI, supra note 52, at 25.
54 Practice Notes: Taxation, CHINA L. & PRAC., Jan. 18, 1988, at 19.
5 Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Terms Tentative Provisions (1990).
' Joint Venture Terms - Deregulation Specified, ASIAN L. & PRAc., Feb. 4, 1991,
at 28 [hereinafter Joint Venture Tenns].
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though they made no provision as far as new rules were concerned, and
there was no other relevant legislation dealing with this point in respect
to WFOEs 7
The same feature is illustrated by the State Council Interim Regula-
tions of the PRC on the Grant and Transfer of the Right to Use Urban
State Owned Land (issued May, 1990), which fail to give guidance on
pledges of land-use rights, merely providing in Articles 34 and 35 that
pledges may not violate unspecified state laws and regulations and must
be registered in accordance with unspecified provisions. 8 Such ambigu-
ous references to unspecified legal requirements or to lawful activities
only serve to increase uncertainty and increase the discretion of the
implementing authority.
As far as non-specification of terms is concerned, the State Council
Interim Administrative Measures for Investment and Management of
Large Tracts of Land by Foreign Business (1990), which is silent on the
term of a development enterprise's land-use rights, is a typical example.
Article 5 merely stipulates that development enterprises obtain their land-
use rights "in accordance with the law." The Measures are also silent on
the question of financial parcel development. 9
Another common omission is the non-specification of which authori-
ties have the power to grant approvals, as exemplified by the State
Council Regulations Concerning the Balance of Foreign Exchange Income
and Expenditure by Sino-Foreign Joint Equity Ventures (1986) which do
not specify which authorities within the complex Chinese bureaucratic
apparatus have the authority to grant approvals for a foreign investment
enterprise to avail itself of the methods provided for overcoming a
foreign exchange imbalance. By requiring the enterprise to seek approval
at several layers of authority, the drafters leave room for bureaucratic
maneuvering.'
6. Catchall Phrases
This has been identified as one of the most typical features of
Chinese law in both imperial timesM and in the modem era. 2 A
' Hu Yuanxiang, Tightening Controls on the Foreign Wholly Owned Enterprises in
the PRC: The Implementing Regulations of the 1986 Foreign Wholly Owned Enterprise
Law, 19 INT'L Bus. LAW. 344, 348 (1991).
1 Jaime P. Horsley, After Heated Debate, China Allows Foreigners to Develop,
Manage Land, E. ASIAN EXEC. REP., Sept. 15, 1990, at 12.
59 Id.
o Zeichner, supra note 10, at 392.
61 The Qing Code was characterised by three primary "catchalls." The most well-
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"catchall phrase" serves to invest an implementing authority with the
option of extending the scope of regulation without the necessity for
legislative amendment. For example, both the Provisional Regulations of
Shanghai Municipal People's Government on Foreign Exchange Loans
Secured by Mortgages (1988) and the Provisional Regulations of Shanghai
Municipal People's Government on Reminbi Loans Secured by Mortgages
(1988) contain the same catchall provision whereby "properties otherwise
not legally mortgageable" cannot be used as collateral, having the effect
of "leaving in limbo the question of what property may be deemed mort-
gageable until negotiations are near completion and security documents
are reviewed by the relevant approval authorities."63
Similarly, the State Council Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Terms
Tentative Provisions (1990) provide in Article 3 for two catchall catego-
ries that may be used to limit the terms of categories of joint ventures
other than those included. These categories are "ventures for which any
other state law or regulation requires that a joint venture term be fixed"
and "ventures engaged in projects in which the state restricts invest-
ment."' Another example is found in the Foreign Wholly Owned Enter-
prise Law Implementing Regulations (1990) which provides, as a fourth
area in which WFOEs are forbidden or restricted: "other industries in
which the Chinese government has prohibited the establishment of
WFOEs."
III. BRINGING LAW DOWN TO REALITY - SPECIFICATION AND
ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION
The rationale of flexibility which underlies the Chinese legal system
is allowed to operate by the relative vagueness and principle-like nature
(yuanzexing) of legal pronouncements of the NPC and the State Council.
The legal system which is presently in the process of construction in
China has been to a large extent drawn from Western legal norms. These
have been superimposed over indigenous normative frameworks of
behaviour which have over time been weakened significantly in many
areas because of the operation of Communist ideology (now largely
discredited) and the process of rapid modernization. The effective applica-
known made it an offence to "do what ought not to be done," indicating the traditional
place of such catchall clauses in Chinese law. Clive Ansley, Chinese Criminal Law
Under Manchus and Marxists, 20 U. BRrr. COLUM. L. REv. 165, 180 (1986).
62 Christopher G. Oechsli, Financing China's Development: Shanghai's New Mort-
gage Laws: Part 2, Forex Mortgage Loan Regulations, E. ASIAN ExEc. REP., Sept. 15,
1988, at 12.
63 Id.
" Joint Venture Terms, supra note 56, at 28.
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tion of law at the level of the law in action and its acceptance by an
unfamiliar and suspicious population is bound to be a difficult and
lengthy process.
The adoption of the philosophy of flexibility in legal drafting and
implementation has, however, allowed the current regime to maintain the
appearance of a viable legal system while retaining within its actual
operation many facets of policy implementation, namely, changeability
and adaptation to local normative structures and conditions. The main
contribution that the new legal system promises to make is to increase
certainty by reducing the scope of executive arbitrariness to the extent
that it is within the general bounds of a flexible law. However, the scope
of executive discretion is still deliberately left relatively wide.
China has a rich tradition of legal flexibility from which to draw.
From ancient times China has possessed laws and regulations. Laws,
which were essentially criminal in nature, provided for strict relationships
between legal acts and legal responsibility to the extent that the
administrator/judges were left with little discretion in implementation.
Criminal law was dispensed objectively and automatically and such
features are still in evidence today. Apart from "law" however, there
existed areas of regulation subject to "extraordinary decisions" under
flexible and fluid rules called tiaoli and duanlie which were applied to
complex social situations in more of a civil context.'
Today, the application of this latter philosophy in administrative
regulation can be clearly exhibited by examining "legal interpretation"
(falu de jieshi) and a phenomenon known as administrative specification
of law (falu de jutihua). Administrative specification is the process by
which law and regulations are interpreted at one level by State Council
departments, and at another level, by local people's congresses and
administrative bodies which apply them to local reality. Law is in effect
brought down or adjusted to local normative reality. Apart from adminis-
trative rules (guizhang), this is often carried out by the formulation of
normative documents (guifangxing wenjian), many of which are created
and applied by local governments at the county level and below in the
form of administrative measures (xingzheng cuoshi).
Higher administrative bodies also practice specification by issuing
internal normative documents to regulate certain technical areas under
' Ji Wei Dong et al., Tai Chugoku Toshi Sokushin to Chugoku no Showaiho Seibi:
Chugokujin no Ho Kannen to "Chugoku Toshi no Jitsumu" [Promotion of Investment
into China and the Preparation of Foreign Related Law: The Concept of Law of the
Chinese and "The Practice of Investment into China"], 206 NIccHu KE.IZAI KYoKAI
KAmO [JAPAN-CHNA ECONOMIC CouNciL BuLLIN=] 7, 18 (1990).
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their jurisdiction. These documents, which normally are revealed to a very
limited segment of the Chinese bureaucracy,6 reflect prevailing policy
and provide much of the detail missing in higher statutes or regulations.
Many of these internal directives are, in effect, interpretations of statutory
law, in some instances, contradicting the letter of the relevant statutes.
History has shown how these have been issued to redefine statutes in the
face of temporary changes in China's economic climate.67
Higher administrative authorities also possess another device through
which they can construe law and regulations in a way that may reflect
departmental policy and/or the social reality of the regulated. This device
is known as "administrative interpretation" (falu de fieshi). Below, the
process of specification is analyzed through an examination of the role
and nature of guifangxing wenjian, following which, administrative
interpretation will be examined.
A. Nonnative Documents (Guifangxing Wenfian)
1. Normative Documents as issued by organs that lack lawmaking
power
Administrative specification is the process by which principle-like
laws are narrowed down through a succession of enactments so that they
can be applied to local reality. The formulation of difangxing guizhang
(local rules) by governments at the provincial, municipal, and "quite big
city" level is but one step in this process. However, the lowest level of
government in a particular locality (note that municipalities and "quite big
cities" are the lowest level of authority in their own areas, and they can
issue guizhang) is where the final level of specification takes place. These
are difficult to define in terms of law. In fact, enactments made by these
authorities, namely, at the county level or below, do not qualify as
legislation in the Chinese legal system. They are normative documents
that lack legal effect before the relevant tribunal under either the Admin-
istrative Litigation Law' or the Administrative Reconsideration Regula-
tions,69 considered, as they are, as merely instruments of legal implemen-
' Jamie P. Horsley, Foreign Investment Provisions: Measures on Debt and Equity
Rules, Foreign Guarantees, E. ASIAN EXEC. REP., Sept. 15, 1987, at 7-8.
67 "For example, during the foreign exchange crisis of 1984 and 1985, policy
makers in China began to curtail certain imports in order to tighten up foreign
exchange expenditures" by issuing the Notice on the Levying of Import Adjustment Tax
on Several Commodities (1985, State Council). Zeichner, supra note 10, at 403.
s Administrative Litigation Law, supra note 22.
Regulations on Administrative Reconsideration, art. 41 (promulgated Dec. 24,
1990). An English translation is available in 1 LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF THE
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tation.
Local governments and congresses at the county level and below are,
however, empowered under both the Constitution and the Local Organic
Law7" to issue such documents, referred to as administrative measures
(xingzheng cuoshi). Article 89(1) of the Constitution7' provides:
The State Council can adopt administrative measures, enact administra-
tive rules and regulations and issue decisions and orders in accordance
with the Constitution and statutes.
Article 9(2) of the Local Organic Law provides:
The people's congresses of townships, nationality townships, and towns
shall adopt and promulgate resolutions within the scope of their func-
tions and powers.
Article 51(1) of the Local Organic Law provides that all governments at
or above the county level shall:
Implement the resolutions of the people's congress and its standing
committee at the corresponding level as well as the decisions and orders
of state administrative organs at higher levels, formulate administrative
measures and issue decisions and orders.
Article 52(1) provides:
The people's government of a township, nationality township, or town
shall implement the resolutions of the people's congress at the corre-
sponding level and the decisions and orders of state administrative
organs at higher levels and issue decisions and orders.
These documents are therefore issued as an exercise of a local
government's inherent power as granted by the Constitution and the Local
Organic Law and are filed with and recorded (in theory) by the enacting
organ's supervisory body, namely, the people's congress at the same
level, or the administrative body at the level immediately superior.
The reason why the Constitution and laws empower all people's
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA GOVERNING FOREIGN RELATED MATrERS 398 (Bureau
of Legislative Affairs of the State Council of the People's Republic of China ed.,
1991).
7 The Organic Law of the Local People's Congresses and Local People's Govern-
ments of the PRC, arts. 9(2), 51(1), 52(2) (1979). An English translation is available
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governments under the provincial government level to make administrative
measures (xingzheng cuoshi), thereby granting such documents a certain
anomalous legal status not recognized by the Administrative Litigation
Law and Administrative Reconsideration Regulations, is explained by
Zhuang Wei Lin in his article The Legality and Determination of Admin-
istrative Measures.72 Indicating their role in bridging the gap between
law and reality, Zhuang states that as the Chinese legal system is not
systematic, administrative measures are needed at the local level to set up
value systems acceptable to people residing in each locality.
Guifangxing wenjian or administrative measures cannot easily be
identified by way of name only. Many titles that are used in xingzheng
fagui and guizhang are also readily utilized by local governments in their
own enactments, thereby making identification difficult. One must be sure
to identify the issuing authority when seeking to ascertain the status of a
certain document. If the formulating body is a local government at the
county level or below, or if it is a local level functional department of
the State Council which has issued a document itself instead of through
the local government or people's congress, any document, no matter what
its title, can be categorized as guifangxing wenfian.
An example of such a document is the Property Regulation Adminis-
tration Rules issued by the Mangzhang Township Level Government to
implement the provincial level implementing measures of the same name
and the national level Property Regulation Law.73 Rules are normally
associated with enactments at the level of guizhang, but in this case, as
they are issued by a township level government which lacks lawmaking
power, the document is guifangxing wenjian.
A further example are provisions entitled Provisions Concerning the
Opening of Deposit Accounts by Enterprises with Foreign Investment, the
Control of Receipts and Payments and the Control of Statements, issued
jointly by the Shanghai Branch of the People's Bank of China, and the
Shanghai Sub-Bureau of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange
Control. Ostensibly, these also appear to be guizhang. However, to be
valid as guizhang they must be issued or at least approved by the Shang-
hai Municipal People's Government, not merely by local functional
' Zhuang Wei Lin, Xingzheng Cuoshi de Hefaxing Jiqi Panding [The Legality and
Assessment of an Administrative Measure], 11 FAXUE [LEG. Sm.] 9 (1990).
3 Administrative Division of the Intermediate Civil Court, Xingyang District,
Qiantan Xingzheng Susongzhong de Falu Shiyong: Shiyong Xingzheng Susongfa di 52,
53 tiao Diandi Tihui (A Discussion of the Application of Law in Administrative Suits:
Some Experiences in Respect to the Application of Articles 52 and 53 of the Adminis-
trative Litigation Law), 29 FA DE XJNMX [LEG. INFO.] 8, 11 (1990) [hereinafter
Administrative Division].
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departments. As they have not been issued by the municipal government,
they have no official legal status before a court of law and can only be
considered as guifangxing wenjian. Other provisions formulated by
functional departments in Shanghai such as the Preferential Provisions
Concerning Taxation of Foreign Investment Enterprises (1988) ' issued
by the Taxation Office of Shanghai Customs, share this feature.
2. Normative documents as Issued by Organs with Lawmaking
Power
A second category of guifangxing wenjian are documents apart from
rules (guizhang) issued by departments of the State Council and other
law-making organs. These are formulated either to make higher legislation
expressed in general terms workable or to provide normative guidance in
areas that as yet lack legislation.75 The process of specification is the
former process and by implication entails an exercise of discretion,
something which State Council departments have in abundance by virtue
of the principle-like nature of higher law. Guifangxing wenjian are not
subject to any enactment procedures and therefore import great flexibility
into the legal system, so much so that their essential changeability can
engender the very thing that the creation of the legal system was sup-
posed to alleviate - uncertainty.
As has been already noted, the distinction between guizhang and
guifangxing wenjian at this level is very unclear as only a small propor-
tion of the regulatory documents formulated are actually issued to the
public. Because these have not been issued, their status as guizhang and
their legal status before the courts is uncertain.
There are as many opinions as there are legal scholars as to where
to draw the line between guizhang and guifangxing wenfian formulated by
State Council departments or people's governments with lawmaking
power. Some scholars categorise all documents, including circulars, as
guizhang as long as they have been drawn to the attention of affected
74 4 SHANGHAiSm WAISHANG Touzi QIYE XiEm HUiKAN [SHANGHAI FOREIGN
INVESTMENT ENTERPRISE ASS'N J.] 13 (1988).
iS See, e.g., Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, Foreign Investment
Regulation Department, The State Planning Commission, The State Council Investment
Work Leadership Group Office Circular Circulating the Provisions Concerning the
Examination and Approval Foreign Investment Feasibility Studies, JIMAO (1987) No.
808 (for internal application), in LiYONG WAizi WENJAN HUaiBAN [COLLECTION OF
DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE USE OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT] 29 (2d ed. 1989) [here-
inafter Foreign Economic Relations].
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parties.76 For example, the Ministry of Finance document, Notice Con-
cerning the Question of the Rate for Conversion into Reminbi of Cash
Foreign Currency Contributed by the Parties to Chinese-Foreign Equity
Joint Ventures, [(87) Cai Kiai Zi, No. 102, December 29, 1987] was
circulated to Baker & McKenzie who published it as a translation in
1988.' Other Chinese scholars take a more exclusive approach to
guizhang, excluding, from this category, all documents at the circular
level and equivalent, thereby designating them as guifangxing wenjian.78
Those that adopt the latter point of view classify all orders (mingling),
directives (zhiling), resolutions (jueyi), instructions (zhishi), announcements
(gongbao), public notices (bugao), notices (tongbao), circulars (tongzhi),
notifications (tongbao), reports (baogao), requisitions for instructions
(qingshi), responses (pifiu), letters (han) and unissued rules, measures and
provisions that are formulated by organs with lawmaking power as
belonging to the guifangxing wenjian category.79
Each of these documents performs one of three functions. They may
deal with internal matters that relate to the relationship between different
departments, administrative procedures, and personnel matters, an example
being the Ministry of Labour and Personnel Circular Concerning How to
Give Public Notification of a Job Vacancy, [Laorengan (1984) No. 8].
Some are primarily concerned with the regulation of social tasks, directing
the regulating authority about what it can and cannot do, for example, the
Circular Concerning the Printing and Distribution of the Appraised
Conditions of Advanced Family Panning Villages, Townships, and Ap-
proved Hamlets [Ejishenwei (1989) No. 8]. Others are formulated in order
to implement law, such as the Wuhan City Implementing Rules for the
Regulation of the Housing Property Market, [Wuhanfangfang (1988) No.
67]80 which implement guizhang entitled the Wuhan City Measures for
Trial Implementation for the Regulation of the Housing Property Mar-
6 Luo, supra note 16, at 74.
' 5 CHINA L. REv. 161 (1989).
" Zhao Guo Lan, Xingzheng Susong Shiyong Falu de Shinwenti (New Problems in
Respect to the Application of Law in Administrative Suits), 29 FA DE XINXI [LEG.
INFo.] 5, 6 (1990).
" Tao-tai Hsia & Constance A. Johnson, Lawmaking in China - Part 11, E. ASIAN
ExEc. REP., Apr. 15, 1987, at 10.
o Although these are entitled implementing rules and issued by a "quite big city"
which is a lawmaking body, these rules may not qualify as guizhang as they have not
been issued and are merely part of the local government document series. See A.H.Y.
CHEN, AN INTRODUCrION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA 85 (1992) (citing Zhang Youyu, Two Comments on the Law of Administrative
Litigation, 4 CHINESE LEG. SCI. 26, 29 (1989).
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ket.81 It is this latter category of guifangxing wenjian with which we are
most concerned in our discussion of specification below.
Given their undefined status under the Administrative Litigation Law
and despite their important role as the basis upon which most administra-
tive regulatory activity is initiated," it is uncertain whether these docu-
ments can be considered as a source of administrative law 3 despite the
fact that administrative departments under the State Council have the
power to formulate them under Article 89(1) of the Constitution." As a
result, for the first time, bureaucrats are being urged by legal scholars to
formulate guifangxing wenjian within the bounds of relevant laws, regula-
tions, and rules. The tendency before the promulgation of the Adminis-
trative Litigation Law was for bureaucrats, particularly those at the local
level, to consider an administrative measure as a law unto itself. Even
today this attitude is reported to persist in many areas of China."
B. Specification by State Council Departments
State council departments specify broad and sometimes ambiguous
law and xingzheng fagui in guizhang and guifangxing wenjian. The
process of specification will be illustrated with reference to several
guifangxing wenjian formulated and applied by these departments for the
purpose of regulating foreign investment.
Because of the unrelenting pace of legal change in China, some of
the rules and normative documents discussed here and within the follow-
ing section (Specification by Local Governments and Local Functional
Departments) are likely to have been superseded by documents formulated
subsequently by Chinese administrative organs. This does not, however,
diminish their value as depictions of the process of specification at work.
1. Example 1 - Specification of an Article in the PRC Equity
Joint Venture Implementing Regulations in Respect to the
Content of Registered Capital by an Internal Document
One regular commentator on Chinese law wrote in March 1992, in
82 Luo, supra note 16, at 11.
Zhao, supra note 78, at 6.
Luo, supra note 16, at 11. The opposing view is that they can be classified as
law as they are formulated or approved by the nation and enforced by national power.
Zhuang, supra note 72, at 9.
XIANFA (1990).
Id. Susan Finder, Like Throwing an Egg Against a Stone? Administrative Liti-
gation in the People's Republic of China, 3 J. CHINESE L. 1, 3 (1989).
' Administrative Division, supra note 73, at 10; Finder, supra note 85, at 10.
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his article on legal regulation of technology transfer into the PRC that:
Although publicly available legislation imposes no restriction on the
amount of technology which may be capitalised (contributed by a
foreign party to registered capital), in practice foreigners are required to
limit such contributions to 15-20% of total registered capital.87
Indeed, neither the Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Law nor the
relevant articles of its Implementing Regulations88 make any such re-
quirement in regard to industrial property and proprietary technology
contributed by a foreign party as registered capital. However, a large
degree of discretion regarding whether or not to accept the content of the
investment is given to MOFERT and its local functional departments by
virtue of Article 30, which provides:
The machinery, equipment or other materials, industrial property rights,
or proprietary technology contributed as investment by a foreign venturer
shall be examined and agreed to by the department in charge of the
Chinese venturer and submitted to the examining and approving agency
for approval.89
As the approving agency, and the agency responsible for interpreting
the Joint Venture Implementing Regulations, MOFERT (now MOFrEC)
chose to specify this article in an unissued internal document entitled
"MOFERT Circular in Regard to a Number of Problems About Which
One Ought to be Aware when Examining and Approving Foreign Invest-
ment Enterprises" dated July 7, 1988 - approximately four years after
the Regulations were issued.
The relevant section provides that:
Operating foreign investment enterprises must have funds or facility
investment, the registered capital should suit the management standard
and social economic responsibilities of the industry. Foreign business-
men, based on their investment in kind, should show a value estimation
certificate of their registered capital issued by an accountancy office.
Industrial property of foreign businessmen, as an investment of specialist
8 John T. Kuzmik, Technology Transfer: A Vital Element in Foreign Investment,
AsIAN L. & PRAC., Mar. 12, 1992, at 33, 36.
, Regulations for the Implementation of the People's Republic of China on Chi-
nese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures, arts. 25, 28, 29 & 30 (1983). An English trans-
lation is available in 1 BUREAU OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA GOVERNING FOREIGN-RELATED MATrERS 521-22
(1991).
89 Id. (Translated by the author).
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technology, etc., generally must not exceed 20% of registered capital.
The document appeared on MOFERT's internal document series [(88)
Waijingmaozi zongzi No. 173],1 but, in accordance with the last sen-
tence of section 8 of the document, which provided that the Circular "will
be applied internally with some discretion by State Council departments
and each locality ... ," was never issued nor even communicated to
interested individuals, enterprises, and organs outside the department.
Indicating the importance placed on guifangxing wenjian of this nature,
the introductory paragraph states that "when each locality examines and
approves foreign investment enterprises (excluding wholly foreign-owned
enterprises), apart from applying State Council regulations, they should be
mindful of the following issues ... " following which the substantive
provisions are listed.9'
2. Example 2 - Specification by Guizhang and Internal
Guifangxing Wenjian of an Article in the "22 Provisions"
Concerning Autonomy of Foreign Investment Enterprises to
Recruit Staff
Ji Wei Dong, a lecturer in Chinese law who hails from Beijing
University and currently lectures at the University of Kobe, has claimed
that the provision of broad law and its specification by means of
guizhang and guifangxing wenjian which delineate areas of substantive
law, operate, on balance, to the advantage of the regulated. He bases this
claim on the fact that the discretion and flexibility inherent in the process
allow regulatory authorities to make concessions in the form of preferen-
tial treatment to foreign investors. He contrasts this with the consequences
for the regulated of the enactment of detailed governing laws, citing in
particular the Technology Contracts Law which he states were "rather
more strict than expected." Ji asserts that "when foreigners call for
essentially flexible rules to be clarified, they are actually painting them-
selves into a comer" and that the Technology Contracts Law is an
example of this.93
As the legitimacy of legal norms is actually undermined by partial
policies of selective non-implementation and inconsistency inherent in the
practice of preferential treatment, it is submitted that the maintenance of
0 Foreign Economic Relations, supra note 75, at 135.
9, A further internal MOFTEC regulation now exists stipulating that no more than
50% of a foreign joint venture party's capital contribution may be in the form of
technology or know-how.
' Ji Wei Dong, supra note 65, at 18-19.
93 Id.
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such practices harms the long-term development of China's legal system.
Moreover, contrary to Ji's assertion, broad law does not necessarily work
to the advantage of foreign investors. It often breeds uncertainty and
creates a gap in expectations held by foreign investors and by Chinese
regulatory agencies. The more one investigates subordinate documents
issued by the State Council departments, the greater this gap appears to
become. Higher law as represented by NPC or State Council enactments
can afford to ostensibly encompass Western legal principles as long as it
is expressed in general terms. However, as administrative organs specify
these enactments further, the subordinate enactments, namely guizhang
and guifangxing wenjian, invariably reintroduce principles more familiar
to the officials of the agencies who are responsible for their implementa-
tion in the Chinese context. In other words, the Western legal principles
are "Sinofied" in the course of specification. This result is inevitable so
long as these agencies are empowered to issue documents that deal with
substantive law in accordance with the "spirit" of higher law.94 Conse-
quently, guifangxing wenfian are more indicative of the real regulatory
practices of officials than higher laws and regulations.
In the area of preferential treatment of foreign investment, for
example, general principles as expressed in the preeminent legislation in
this area, the State Council Encouragement of Foreign Investment Provi-
sions (22 Provisions),95 appeared to guarantee foreign investors the
application of familiar Western regulatory norms such as management
autonomy and freedom to recruit labour. However, in the course of
specification these guarantees took on a new meaning as they were in-
terpreted from the perspective of Chinese central and local regulatory
agencies whose expectation of the norms embodied in the law did not
necessarily always match those held by foreign investors, or even, for that
matter, those held by the drafters themselves.
In respect to enterprise autonomy, the 22 Provisions provide at
Article 15 that:
[P]eople's governments at each level and relevant departments should
guarantee the autonomy of foreign investment enterprises, and support
foreign investment enterprises to manage themselves in accordance with
international methods of advanced technology.
Foreign investment enterprises have the right within the scope of the
approved contract, to autonomously make production management plans,
raise money, utilise funds, acquire materials for production, sell goods,
4 See, e.g., Administrative Bench, supra note 73, at 11.
9 State Council Encouragement of Foreign Investment Provisions (forthcoming).
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autonomously set wage standards, the form of salary, as well as bonuses
and system of allowances.
Foreign investment enterprises, based on the needs of production man-
agement, may autonomously make organisational and staff arrangements,
hire and dismiss high level management, increase or dismiss workers; in
the locality advertise for and recruit skilled workers, management and
workers, and staff employed by their unit should give support and allow
mobility; and with respect to infringements of the system of rules which
cause certain consequences, foreign investment enterprises may, based on
actual circumstances of the case, impose a variety of disciplinary
sanctions up to and including discharge. Advertising for, recruitment,
and dismissal or discharge of staff should be reported to the local
department of labour and personnel for filing.
This Article was specified by guizhang and guifangxing wenjian and
formulated by State Council departments soon after the 22 Provisions
were promulgated. The first of these were guizhang, The Ministry of
Labour and Personnel (as it then was) Provisions in Regard to the
Autonomy of Foreign Investment Enterprises to Utilise Labour, Determine
Wages of Staff and Fees for Insurance and Welfare (Provisions), which
was issued about six weeks after the 22 Provisions on November 26,
1986. These were further specified by unissued measures, guifangxing
wenjian dated August 4, 1987, annexed to a circular that appeared in the
document series of the Ministry of Labour and Personnel, Laorengan
([1987] No. 34), entitled The Measures for the Regulation of Leaders on
the Chinese Side of Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures (Leaders' Measures).
' Foreign Economic Relations, supra, note 75, at 34. Some documents that are is-
sued or promulgated, and almost every document which is not, belongs to a document
series which emanates from the State Council and each of its departments. Some of the
document series and their issuing bodies are as follows:
* State Council - Guofa, Guobanfa.
* Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (now Ministry of Foreign Tech-
nological and Economic Cooperation) - Waijinmaozizi, Waijinmaofazi,
Waijinmaoguanchizi, Waijinmaozisizi, Waijinmaojitongzi, Waijinmaozierzi.
- Ministry of Labour and Personnel (now split into two ministries) - Laorenbanhua,
Laaorengan, Laorenhuju.
* Ministry of Finance - Zaigongzi, Zaishuizi (tax), Zaishuiwaizi (tax), Zaihuizi (foreign
exchange).
* National Customs Administration - Chushuizi (tax), Chuhuozi (trade), Chuxingzi.
* State Administration of Exchange Control - Yinghanhuiguantiaozi, Huiguantiaozi.
* Bank of China - Yingfazi, Zhongyezi, Yingfa, Zhongzongzi, Zhongxingzi.
* State Economic Commission (now disbanded) - Jingjin.
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One year later, a document, the Ministry of Labour and Ministry of
Personnel Opinion Concerning "Furthering by One Step" the Implementa-
tion of the Autonomy of Foreign Investment Enterprises to Utilise
Labour, was formulated (Opinion). Applying specifically to coastal
regions, the Opinion was attached to a Circular that was disseminated by
the State Council Office, appearing in the Ministry of Labour Document
Series Laorengan ([1988] No. 20).'
Article 15 of the 22 Provisions was also indirectly impacted upon by
another important regulatory document, also of August 1987, annexed to
a circular entitled Circular of The State Economic Commission, Central
Ministry of Propaganda, Central Ministry of Organisation, All-China
General Council of Trade Unions and Central Youth League in respect of
the printing and distribution of "Temporary Provisions in Regard to
Ideological and Policy Work for Those Holding Positions on the Chinese
Side of Equity and Cooperative Joint Ventures" (Ideology Provisions),
which appeared in a document series on economic policy entitled
Jingzheng (Jingzheng [19871 No. 483)."s
C. Supervision by the Local Labour and Personnel Office Over
Recruitment
Through the use of the word "autonomously" (zixing), Article 15 of
the 22 Provisions appears to make a genuine commitment to management
autonomy, especially in relation to labour recruitment and dismissal
practices. This is confirmed by the last sentence which provides that
"advertising for, recruitment, and dismissal or discharge of staff should be
reported to the local department of labour and personnel for filing." This
appears to limit the role of the local labour office to one where it merely
"remains informed" about labour recruitment and dismissal by means of
filing, implying that it need not be at all involved in the process, unless
of course, the foreign investment enterprise requests assistance.
In the course of the specification of this Article by subordinate rules
(guizhang) of the Ministry of Labour, however, the meaning of the
" State Administration of Industry and Commerce - Gongshang, Gongshangqizi, Qiwaizi.
o Ministry of Textile Industry - Fangbanzi.
" State Planning Commission - Jizi.
* State Bureau of Supplies and Materials - Wujizi.
" State Scientific and Technological Commission - Guoliaofazong(yin)zi.
" Ministry of Light Industry - Qingshizi.
* Import and Export Commodities Bureau - Guojianwuzi.
97 Id. at 131.
99 Id. at 36.
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autonomy to "hire and fire" was altered. Article 1-1 of the Provisions
provides:
Foreign investment enterprises may, based on the needs of production
management, autonomously determine their organisational and personnel
makeup, and with the assistance of the local labour and personnel
office, autonomously hire and dismiss staff, and through assessment
select the best candidates.
The italicised words, with the assistance (de xiezhuxia) of the local
labour and personnel office, imported a requirement that the Labour
office be involved with the process of hiring and firing. The significance
of the addition of this phrase cannot be understated in terms of its impact
on foreign investment enterprise autonomy. Mandatory local labour office
involvement in this process, therefore, extends far further than that sug-
gested by the filing requirement mentioned in Article 15 of the governing
regulations. This is confirmed in the Provisions which also provide that
recruitment must be carried out with the assistance of the local labour
department.
D. Recruitment Outside the Immediate Locality
The Provisions also extended the scope of the 22 Provisions. The 22
Provisions only made arrangements for recruitment from within the lo-
cality. However, the Ministry of Labour and Personnel felt free to recruit
outside the locality without first having the relevant governing section in
the 22 Provisions altered, thereby indicating the significance of the
principle that lower rules should be drafted in accordance with the spirit,
not necessarily the letter of governing law." The relevant article in the
Provisions, Article 1-1, provides in its second clause:
If there is no way in which management and engineering/technical
personnel needed by Foreign Investment Enterprises (FIE) can be
recruited from within the locality, recruitment can be made from another
locality if approval is acquired from the relevant district labour and
personnel department through discussions with the FIE's local district,
autonomous zone or municipality labour and personnel department.
Chinese rulemakers are not restricted by the scope of higher legisla-
tion in the same way as are rulemakers in jurisdictions which have a
strong tradition of judicial review of abstract administrative acts. In short,
higher law is treated in the same manner as a policy pronouncement, the
mandate for the formulation of implementing rules being vague and
Administrative Division, supra note 73, at 11.
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flexible in scope.
The Measures at Article 2-1, further specified Article 1-1 of the
Provisions providing:
Joint ventures may, in respect to their requirements for managers and
technicians, with the assistance (xiezhuxia) of the local government
department of labour and personnel, in accordance with the relevant
national regulations, publicly recruit staff through examination or as-
sessment and choose the best candidate; if it cannot be satisfied (bu
neng manzu) by local recruitment, where necessary, the joint venture
may recruit from other localities with the assistance of (xiezhuxia) the
local government labour and personnel department.
This actually softened the Provision's stipulations in respect to out-
of-locality recruitment. The Provisions stated that the foreign investment
enterprise could only recruit from other areas if there was "no way"
(wufa) in which recruitment could be effected locally. However, the
Internal Measures merely provided that the foreign enterprise be "dis-
satisfied" with the results of local recruitment efforts with a proviso
stating that filling the position is "necessary."
This "softening" may have been in response to the reaction by
foreign investment enterprises to the publication of the Provisions nine
months prior. As such, they are a further example of specification and the
underlying philosophy of legal flexibility. Joint ventures possess important
but little-known avenues to bring pressure to bear on specification of this
kind. This is the China Association of Enterprises with Foreign Invest-
ment, an independent association of joint ventures with branches in most
major Chinese cities that is set up in order to provide assistance to its
members. It also acts as a lobby group that can take problems and
proposals to MOFTEC. One of the Association's functions is to arrange
meetings between joint venture representatives and government leaders in
order to air grievances in respect to foreign investment regulation. Such
lobbying can be very effective. For example, it would appear that the
Association was primarily responsible for lobbying MOFrEC and acquir-
ing its support to alter Article 6 of the Equity Joint Venture Law (1979).
Article 6 provided that the chairman of the joint venture board must be
from the Chinese side. In amendments that were enacted by the NPC in
1990, this article was changed to allow a member from the foreign side
of the venture to assume the post of chairman. It is reported that the
Association has been particularly active in respect to lobbying in the area
of labor regulation."°
"o Interview with Zhu Xinren, Deputy Director, Investing Consultancy Department,
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E. Joint Venture Autonomy in Respect to Selection Criteria for the
Appointment of Personnel
We have ascertained the method by which the local labour depart-
ment was given a role in the recruitment process. By further analysing
the specified provisions we can also ascertain the criteria in relation to
staff appointments that the labour department has the responsibility of
enforcing. It appears that the Party Committee within the labor depart-
ment, and each original unit, gives ultimate approval regarding a candi-
date's conformity with the political elements of this criteria.
Upon examination of the 22 Provisions, it is not apparent that the
freedom of joint ventures to determine appropriate staff was restricted in
any way by external selection criteria. The 22 Provisions provide:
Foreign investment enterprises, based on the needs of production man-
agement, may autonomously make organisational and staff arrangements,
hire and dismiss high level management, increase or dismiss workers; in
the locality advertise for and recruit technicians, management and
workers ....
In respect to appointments (weipai) by a Chinese party to a joint
venture of higher level cadres such as directors, the Provisions provide:
(1-3) The high level management (gaoji guanli yuanyuan) appointed
(weipai) by the Chinese side should be able to master policy, understand
technology, have the ability to manage, be bravely entrepreneurial, and
be able to cooperate with foreigners. The relevant departments should
support their work, and during the period of their appointment, generally
should not transfer their post to someone else; where it is essential to
transfer their post, they should ask for the approval of the board of
directors.
The Provisions, however, do not lay down any criteria in respect to
staff recruited (pingyong) by the joint venture. For this, one must look to
the Leaders' Measures which provide:
(4) The managing director and directors appointed by the Chinese side
of the joint venture and the general manager, deputy general manager,
chief engineer, chief accountant, chief auditor and other high level
management personnel should have the following characteristics:
China Association of Enterprise with Foreign Investment, conducted by the author on
Thursday, May 22, 1990.
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(1) Adhering to the four basic principles, ability to correctly apply the
policy of opening to the outside world, familiarity with policy and
regulations with respect to economic work, especially with respect to
accepting and using investment law and regulations;
(2) Familiarity with the business of production technology in the indus-
try involved, be good at management, have organisational ability, have
the ability to correctly adhere to the management direction;
(3) Possess an entrepreneurial spirit, be honest in performing one's
official duties, be honest and upright, have a good intellect, have the
ability to adhere to principle, and be good at cooperating with foreign-
ers.
(4) High level cadres in large and medium size ventures must generally
have a high cultural level and the main and assistant general managers
should understand a foreign language.
The provisions that higher level staff should (i) have the ability to
adhere to principle and (ii) be good at cooperating with foreigners in sub-
section three of the Leader's Measures are particularly significant. The
former means that they must be politically and ideologically sound and
do not have any chufen or "black marks" in this respect on their personal
files. Candidates for higher level staff positions must be confirmed by
Article 7 of the Leader's Measures which provides that cadres from the
Chinese side preparing to take up high level management positions for
which they have been recommended first must make an internal report
and then get approval from the unit that recommended them.
The latter refers to their ability to get along with foreigners without
being corrupted by them, the implied meaning, clearly understood by all
Chinese in that position, being that their first responsibility is to China's
welfare over and above that of the joint venture. Any candidates for a
senior joint venture position will, at an initial stage, be screened, usually
by the Party Committee of their original unit, as to whether or not they
satisfy these criteria.
In addition to this initial screening, if appointed by the joint venture,
high level appointees receive preparatory training which incorporates
political education in order to reinforce the attitudes deemed appropriate
for high level staff:
(6) Leaders from the Chinese side who are preparing to be appointed
and recommended for high level positions within the joint venture must
undergo "training" (the content of the "training" includes becoming
familiar with the State policy of opening to the outside world, foreign
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related regulations and laws, basic knowledge of foreign trade and use
of foreign investment, etc.) in order to improve their thought (sixiang),
professional work, skills and management level; specialist technical staff
must undertake specialised training before assuming their posts.
F. Joint Venture Autonomy in Respect to the Criteria for Assessment
and Promotion of Staff
The Leaders' Measures also provided for regular ideological assess-
ment of high level staff:
7) Leaders from the Chinese side preparing to take up high level
management positions for which they have been recommended in a joint
venture, must first internally make a report and get approval from the
unit that recommended them; After starting work at the joint venture,
they are to be assessed as to their work performance and to whether
they are ideologically sound (sixiang biaoxian).
Autonomy in joint ventures was also impacted upon by rules released
by the State Economic Commission, Ministry of Propaganda, Ministry of
Organisation, Federation of Trade Unions and Youth League Central
Committee, the Provisional Provisions Concerning Ideological-Political
Work for Staff on the Chinese Side of Joint Ventures, (Ideology Provi-
sions). In providing guidelines for the content of political education of
Chinese staff within the joint venture, the provisions clearly provide
criteria against which promotions are assessed. For example, the provi-
sions state:
7) In order to guarantee the smooth development of ideological-political
work, all equity and cooperative joint ventures should, in accordance
with documents of the Central Ministry of Organisations, the All-China
Committee of Trade Unions and Central Youth League and relevant law,
regulations and provisions, establish and perfect Party organisation,
Trade Unions and Youth League structures. The subordinate relationship
of the Youth League to the Party generally ought to be identical to
other administrative relationships of subordination. The Party and Youth
League organisations generally are not constituted by technical personnel,
and the Party and Youth League may take responsibility in respect to,
and in accordance with certain conditions befitting the enterprise,
exercising leadership over cadres and sections of the enterprise or the
appointment of cadres of the trade union. Enterprises where staff num-
bers are quite high, after acquiring the understanding or support of the
foreign side, in accordance with the principle of efficiency, may appoint
the necessary quantity of specialist political cadres.
8) The cadres undertaking ideological-political work in Sino-foreign
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equity and cooperative joint ventures, should, in accordance with the
"four modemisations," by understanding.policy, the business and how to
be ideologically correct, be good at working together with foreign
personnel. The administrative leaders of the enterprise and higher rel-
evant departments should pay attention to their ideology, their work,
their study and life, and work constantly to improve their ideology and
business standards, and those who excel in their performance should be
given praise.
The operation of these provisions is illustrated by the documented
experience of Beijing Jeep. The members of the staff of Beijing Jeep who
were Party members were responsible for political education, propaganda,
and social welfare. Numbering about 300 out of the total work force of
4000 employees, they had influence over promotions and key appoint-
ments. Through this influence, the party members had influence over
management."'
With the gradual marginalisation of the ideology promoted by the
CCP, it would appear that enforcement of these provisions has been
extremely uneven. Implementation is rigorous in those joint ventures
which contain active Party committees. However, in many joint ventures,
particularly those situated in regions further away from Beijing, such as
Guangdong, the role of political education appears to have declined in the
face of new values now accorded priority, namely wealth and material
success. Lack of support by foreign managers has also contributed to the
decline of the role of political education. The Explanation annexed to the
Ideological Provisions admits that as early as 1987, of the 2,211 FIEs
surveyed the seven provinces, forty-eight percent employed only several
Party members, 18.2% had no Party members on their books at all, and
the work of Party organs in many other FIEs was being hindered by a
lack of understanding and support from the foreign joint venture partici-
pant.' The decline in Party activity in foreign-funded enterprises, and
the total absence of its membership in wholly owned foreign enterprises
is high.' Circumstances in Beijing Jeep reflect this trend; it has been
101 Jim Mann, BEmNG JEEP: THE SHORT UNHAPPY ROMANCE OF AMERICAN
BusuiFss IN CHINA 249 (1989).
'0 Article 2-1, Jingzhi [1987] No. 483.
103 The Party resolved at the end of 1993 to try to form basic level Party
organisations within foreign-funded enterprises, particularly wholly foreign-owned
enterprises, in response to an internal document which reported that approximately 70%
of wholly owned foreign enterprises lacked any Party group. This was due to enterpris-
es instructing local enterprise management departments which are responsible for
supplying staff not to select CCP members and the departments being responsive to
such requests. Li Han, CPC Penetration into Foreign Companies Viewed, CHENG MING,
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reported a significant amount of workers preferred to receive chufen in
the form of fines deducted from their pay, rather than be forced to attend
the mandatory political study sessions."
It should be noted that the right of management of joint ventures to
impose administrative punishments was retained in the 22 Provisions and
escaped specification, merely being duplicated in the Provisions and the
Leaders' Measures.
G. Management Autonomy as an Ideal Rather than a Reality
In light of what has been noted about the specification of the 22
Provisions, it appears that they are actually hortative in the sense that
joint venture autonomy in respect to labour utilisation is an ideal. By
specifying this section of the 22 Provisions and applying it to normative
reality, government departments naturally must deal with the task of
reconciling the autonomy of joint ventures with the reality in China of
strict regulatory control (by both the Party and administrative organs) over
worker mobility, and every other aspect of working life. Indeed, the
Ministry of Labour and Personnel, (as it was previously known) in the
process of specification, sought to actively grapple with the problems
involved in acquiring approvals for recruitment of staff by providing in
the Provisions:
(1-2) FIEs through assessment determine the engineering and technical
staff, management and technical workers they will employ, and the
original work unit actively support this and allow the relocation. Where
there is a dispute the local labour and personnel departments make a
ruling.
This however was altered and further refined by the Leaders' Mea-
sures which provided:
3) The joint venture through either examination or assessment deter-
mines the specialized technicians and managers it will recruit, and the
original work unit or supervisory department must actively give support
and allow relocation. If there is a dispute, the supervisory department of
the joint venture should consult with the relevant unit to solve the
problem, and if it still cannot be solved through consultation, the local
department of labour and personnel to the work unit should arbitrate,
and if the dispute cuts across regions, the higher level labour and per-
May 1, 1994, at 28, an English translation is microformed on PrEx 7.10:FBIS-CHI-94-
103 (Foreign Broadcast Info. Serv.).
"o MANN, supra note 96, at 251.
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sonnel department should arbitrate. All parties (JV, the units in which
the cadres are located, the people involved) should abide by the deci-
sion of the labour and personnel department.
This was still further refined by the Ministry of Labour, and the
Ministry of Personnel Opinion Concerning Furthering the Implementation
of the Autonomy of Foreign Investment Enterprises to Utilise Labor
(Opinion), which was issued one year after both the Provisions and the
Internal Measures on April 25, 1988. The Opinion added that in certain
circumstances, prospective joint venture staff have the right to resign, pro-
viding that:
2) In the process of recruitment of necessary personnel by the FIE, the
relevant departments and units should provide active support, allowing
transfer, without imposing inappropriate charges, or restrictive measures
such as the taking back of accommodation. If the work unit of origin
without justification resists, the person being recruited may resign, and
after his resignation continue to increase his length of service
(gongling).°5 If there is a dispute, the people involved may apply for
the matter to be arbitrated at the local labour dispute arbitration
committee or the local personnel exchange service organ, and all
relevant parties to the dispute must implement the arbitrator's decision.
If it is necessary, the local labour department and personnel department
may directly handle the transfer of the person being recruited.
The difference in these three documents illustrates that an unissued
normative document may prevail over guizhang where it is formulated in
accordance with the spirit of the higher document and is more recent in
time. This is most starkly illustrated by the Opinion, which explicitly
provides that it is to prevail in case of conflict with higher law:
7) This Opinion is to apply if there is any conflict between it and
Articles 3 and 6 of the PRC Provisions for the Regulation of Labour in
Joint Ventures [Guofa (1980) No. 199] issued by the State Council,
Article 34 of the Equity Joint Venture Implementing Regulations, Article
15 of the 22 Articles, Article 2 of the Provisional Provisions for the
Handling of Labour Disputes in State Enterprises and Articles 1, 2 and
3 of the Provisional Provisions for the Administration of Labour in
Sino-foreign Joint Ventures.
The Opinion is actually an example of specification working in a
way that seeks to liberalize the provisions of higher documents that have
narrowed down the scope of the 22 Provisions. The relevant articles of
105 This is important for the accrual of welfare and housing benefits.
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the Opinion which have not already been mentioned above, provide:"°
In order to improve the environment for investment, and for the purpose
of further implementing the strategy of developing the economies of
coastal regions, the following opinion is put forward in respect to
promoting the autonomy of FIEs to utilise personnel:
1) The workers, technical personnel and managerial staff (includ-
ing high level cadres) needed by FIEs may be employed through
public recruitment within society, by selective recruitment through
recommendation by the Chinese side of a joint venture. If the
personnel required by the enterprise are not available within the
locality, [then] recruitment can be undertaken outside the locality.
3) Where the FIE in order to recruit staff crosses the jurisdiction-
al boundary of the province, municipality or quite large city, the
relevant local labour and personnel departments should, without
reporting this a second time to the provincial level labour depart-
ment and personnel department for approval, perform
organisational coordination and services.
4) When a Chinese enterprise enters into a joint venture agree-
ment with a foreign enterprise, the original enterprise may select
its best staff according to the needs of the joint venture. The joint
venturer on the Chinese side and the supervisory department
should settle the matter of recruitments in an appropriate way,
and the local government should actively assist in the making of
these adjustments.
5) FIEs may according to the contract and relevant provisions
dismiss staff, and all departments, units and individuals should not
intervene. Those dismissed who were originally transfered or
engaged on a secondment basis from another unit should be taken
back by that unit at which they were employed prior to recruit-
ment, and they will be registered with the local labour service
company or personnel exchange service organ as waiting for
employment, and may be recommended for employment through
the relevant department, or else themselves actively seek and find
a job of their own accord.
6) In respect to Sino-foreign joint ventures, the Managing Director,
' Sections which represent specification of the 22 Provisions, Provisions and
Leaders' Measures are italicised.
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and the Directors from the Chinese side of the joint venture,
during their period of tenure must not without authorization be
transferred, and if there is a need for transfer, the unit seeking to
appoint them must request the opinion of the organ that examined
and approved the relevant enterprise and the opinion of the joint
venture. Chinese-side high level cadres recruited by the joint
venture, during the period of the employment contract cannot be
transferred without the approval of the board of directors and the
general manager. No department has the power to transfer staff.
Although most of the Opinion merely represents a duplication of
provisions in the Leaders' Measures that were formulated and transmitted
to relevant departments and localities a year earlier, it did, through
specification, liberalise some of the provisions of the Leaders' Measures
and the Provisions. Significantly, the Opinion only applied to coastal
cities, thereby reflecting Government policy that the coastal regions be
"one step ahead" (fin yi bu)."°7
The above discussion illustrates that the interpretation of a piece of
legislation adopted by a Chinese regulatory department does not necessari-
ly match the interpretation that a foreign investor would derive from his
reading of the same enactment. Such differences in normative expectation
only become apparent upon close examination of the relevant implement-
ing rules and other normative documents.
Some may categorise this phenomenon as deliberate "window
dressing" in order to attract foreign investment under false pretenses.
However, such judgments are too harsh. Vague law naturally leads to a
difference in normative expectation depending on the background of the
"o The formal procedure for enactment of xingzheng fagui by the State Council are
laid down in The Provisional Regulations for the Formulation Procedure of Xingzheng
Fagui, issued and published by the State Council General Office on April 21, 1987.
Enactment procedure at and below the level of administrative rules is not subject to
any procedural guidelines, resulting in vague drafting processes from which it is dif-
ficult to ascertain whether an instrument has been legally enacted. A national-level
"procedural law" has not been enacted. Some local governments have, however, passed
their own rulemaking procedures. See, e.g., Shenzhen Municipal People's Government,
Formulation of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Rules and Regulations and Drafting
of the Rules and Regulations in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Procedural Provi-
sions, 2 CHINA L. & PRAc. 12 (1993) (laying down procedures in respect to planning,
drafting, examining, approving, and promulgating local rules). The Shenzhen Municipal
People's Congress has also adopted procedural rules for the enactments. 2 CHINA L. &
PRAC. 13 (1993). This may be explained because Shenzhen, as a Special Economic
Zone, tends to be "a step ahead" of the rest of the country. Daniel Kwan, Managers
in SEZ Get More Powers, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 27, 1993, at 6.
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interpreter. As can be understood from the normative variety of local
implementing legislation," 8 the differences in interpretation from region
to region of "the spirit" of the governing central law can also be quite
significant. Discrepancy in interpretation is an inevitable and unavoidable
result of specification of broad law and, for better or for worse, it is this
system that China has chosen to adopt as its own.
H. Specifications by Local Governments and Local Functional
Departments
China is a country which encompasses regions at vastly different
stages of economic development, with every province, city, and county
having its own peculiar features and problems. Kenneth Lieberthal
describes China's regional diversity in the following terms:
The provinces and directly ruled cities (Tianjin, Beijing and Shanghai)
vary enormously in size, population, climate, topology, and level of
economic development. Chinese provinces are the size of countries:
Sichuan, over 100 million people; Henan and Shandong, 75 million
each; Jiangsu and Guangdong, 61 million each. Some have large concen-
trations of non-Han, minority peoples, while others are nearly pure Han.
Mountain ranges define the boundaries of some provinces, with the core
of such provinces defined by a set of river valleys. Hunan, Jiangsu,
Shanxi, and Sichuan are examples. Others have less well defined, natural
boundaries. Some have a well defined sense of cultural and historical
distinctiveness (such as Guangdong or Shanghai), while others either
have a less well defined provincial identity (Jilin and perhaps Henan) or,
due to their topography and linguistic considerations, embrace distinctive
cultural subunits of great longevity (Fujian or Anchui). Some correspond
to relatively self-contained, natural economic systems (Sichuan); others
are a part of a larger, natural economic region (Hubei in central China
or Hebei as part of the north China plain); and others fall into more
than one natural commercial system (Zhejiang, Inner Mongolia or
Shaanxi).1 9
Central power authorities and empowered administrative authorities
only make laws dealing with national concerns, the content of which are
expressed in the form of broad principles as the Chinese believe it
impractical and unnecessary for these authorities to make detailed provi-
sions in regard to every aspect of social and economic life. The onus
" See infra Section llI.G.
109 KENNETH LIEBERTHAL & M. ODEENBERG, BUREAUCRATiC POLICIES AND CHINESE
ENERGY DEVELOPMENT 330 (1986).
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falls on local governments for the interpretation and actual implementation
of these principles in accordance with local conditions.
As mentioned above, local people's congresses and governments
below the provincial level, although they lack official lawmaking power
(the exception being municipalities and "quite large" cities which are in
effect local bodies that do possess lawmaking power),"' are authorised
by the Constitution and Local Organic Law to enact administrative
measures that specify and detail"' guizhang enacted by higher level
people's governments according to local reality, the stated objective being
to realise guizhang's function as a tool to adjust society."' Chinese
legal scholars Ying Songnian and Dong Hao describe specification in the
following terms:
In enacting and using administrative rules and regulatory documents,
administrative organs do not deny laws, statutes and regulations, but
within the scope of their functions and powers they (either) supplement
gaps in the law, statutes and regulations, or make them more specific.
The application of administrative rules and regulations is a specific
manifestation of the administrative excercise of law enforcement." 3
The process of specification is, therefore, an attempt to address the
reality of diversity, localism, and uneven development in China - a
deliberate effort to overcome the inherent limitations of a unitary system
of law in a large and incredibly diverse country. It is a process in which
law is continually adjusted to match the social exigencies of the locality
in question. In essence, the power to enact local legislation whether it be
difang xingzheng fagui, difang guizhang as enacted by local municipalities
and "quite big" cities, or administrative measures (xingzheng cuoshi)
enacted by local counties"4 and townships,"' essentially amounts to a
form of local legal autonomy that parallels local political autonomy. The
11 Zhuang, supra note 72, at 10.
Id. at 9.
112 Id.
.. Ying & Dong, supra note 25, at 57.
..4 Under Article 51 of the Local Organic Law, governments at or above the county
level can formulate administrative measures, decisions, and orders. The Organic Law of
the Local People's Congresses and Local People's Governments of the PRC (1979). An
English translation is available in CHINA LAW YEARBOOK, 1987, at 138, 144-45
(Publishing House of Law, Beijing, 1989).
"' Under Article 9 of the Local Organic Law, the township level people's congress
can pass resolutions within the scope of their functions and powers. The Organic Law
of the Local People's Congresses and Local People's Governments of the PRC, art. 9
(1979). An English translation is available in CHINA LAW YEARBOOK, 1987, at 138,
144-45 (Publishing House of Law, Beijing, 1989).
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result is a "not-so-unitary" legal system that sits uncomfortably between
unitary and federal systems of law.
For the regulated, it is the lowest form of local regulatory norm, the
administrative measure in the case of counties and townships and local
guizhang and/or guifangxing wenjian in the case of municipalities and
"quite big" cities, that represents the formal law of the state at the level
of the law in action. However, such measures are neither subject to strict
procedure or enactment"6 nor, like other abstract administrative acts
such as law, xingzheng fagui or guizhang, are challengeable under the
Administrative Litigation Law or Administrative Reconsideration Regula-
tions."7 Supervision for legality and consistency is the responsibility of
the administrative authority immediately above,"' the people's con-
gress," 9 or the standing committee" at the same or higher level, al-
though it is doubtful whether this is conducted on anything more than a
nominal basis.
Irrespective of whether they are applicable in administrative litigation
and reconsideration, the Constitution and the Local Organic Law grant
administrative organs of local counties and townships the right to enact
and apply xingzheng cuoshi. They are without a doubt, as Ying Songnian
and Dong Hao maintain, playing a role in practice and cannot be re-
placed.. under the present framework of legal regulation.
Discrepancy in interpretation and implementation of central law from
one local jurisdiction to another is considered a natural consequence of
specification. It is not, as asserted by some foreign commentators, evi-
dence of the failure to institute an all-encompassing system of consistent
legal interpretation." The creation of such a system was never an ob-
116 Zhuang, supra note 72, at 10.
,' Administrative Litigation Law, art. 12(2); an English translation is available in 1
LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE's REPUBULic OF CHINA GOVERNING FOREIGN
RELATED MATTERS 356 (Bureau of Legislative Affairs of the State Council of the
People's Republic of China ed., (1991)). Regulations on Administrative Reconsideration,
art. 10(1); an English translation is available in 1 LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA GOVERNING FOREIGN RELATED MATTERS 398 (Bureau
of Legislative Affairs of the State Council of the People's Republic of China ed.,
(1991)).
"' The lowest "administrative body immediately above" is the county level govern-
ment. The Organic Law of the Local People's Congresses and Local People's Govern-
ments of the P.R.C., art. 51(3) (1979). An English translation is available in CHINA
LAW YEARBOOK, 1987, at 138, 144-45 (Publishing House of Law, Beijing, 1989).
"19 Id. at arts. 7(10), 9(8), 11.
1- Id. at arts. 38(7), 8.
.2 Ying & Dong, supra note 25, at 58.
'" Ji Wei Dong, supra note 65, at 18.
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jective and is in fact antithetical to the whole concept of legal spec-
ification.
1. Local Specification of 22 Articles' Provisions on Management
Autonomy
Article 15 of the 22 Articles and lower departmental rules and
normative documents, which were examined above in the context of
central departmental specification, were further specified at the local level
in local guizhang issued by the Shanghai Municipal People's Govern-
ment" and further provisions issued by the Shanghai Labour Bureau. 24
The former provides at Article 6 that:
Enterprises with foreign investment may employ and recruit technical
personnel, managerial personnel and workers within the territory of
Shanghai. These enterprises may also employ or secure the above-
mentioned personnel from other provinces and cities under the guidance
of the labour and personnel department. If they are dismissed, they shall
return to where they come from.
These provisions, although they do not stipulate that the foreign
enterprise need conform to any filing requirement or that the services of
the local labour bureau be utilised when seeking to recruit staff from
within Shanghai, provide that the recruitment of staff from other regions
must be conducted under the guidance of (zhilingxia) the labour and
personnel department. This is potentially much more intrusive than that
which is implied by the words with the assistance of found in the
Ministry of Labour Measures or the filing (beian) requirement found in
the governing State Council Regulations.
Admittedly, as a matter of practical necessity, one is compelled to
solicit the assistance of the local labour bureau in China in order to
recruit from other regions. However, the Shanghai Labour Bureau Regula-
tions specified this further, in Article 2 which provides:
Staff and workers needed by enterprises with foreign investment may be
either recommended by a superior administration and the Chinese partner
from their own industrial system and accepted through an examination
'2 Provisions of Shanghai Municipality for the Encouragement of Foreign Investment
(promulgated Oct. 23, 1986).
124 The Regulations of Shanghai Labour Bureau and Shanghai Personnel Bureau for
the implementation of Relevant Articles in "Provisions of the Shanghai Municipality for
the Encouragement of Foreign Investment" Concerning Staff and Worker's Employment
(promulgated Aug. 17, 1987).
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and review process, or recruited from the public within the territory of
Shanghai under the guidance of the Shanghai Labour Bureau and
Shanghai Personnel Bureau.
Therefore, in Shanghai, even when recruiting locally, one must still
recruit under the guidance of the local labour bureau despite the apparent
guarantees of management autonomy in this respect provided in Article
15 of the 22 Provisions. Furthermore, higher documents and rules provide
that the role of the local labour bureau is one of mere assistance - which
in any language has overtones far less intrusive than the word guidance.
By way of comparison, in Tianjin Municipality, the Regulatory
Measures of Tianjin Municipality Concerning Cadres of the Chinese side
of Sino-foreign Equity and Cooperative Joint Ventures"z (Tianjin Mea-
sures) also provide for local recruitment under the guidance of the local
labour bureau."2 However, the relevant legislation in Guangdong
Province, the Regulatory Provisions Concerning Cadres on the Chinese
side of Foreign Investment Enterprises," provide for the same with the
assistance of the local labor bureau, therefore underlining the regional
disparities in respect to the specification of this point."
The Tianjin Measures reinforced the concept of "guidance" by further
providing in respect to the recruitment of management and technical
personnel:
Equity and Cooperative joint ventures, before advertising for manage-
ment and technical staff on the Chinese side, should firstly submit some
summary principles and the standard contract to be adopted to the
Municipal Office. After an examination that ascertains whether it con-
forms with laws and regulations, the joint venture will, in accordance
with the opinion of the Municipal Office, advertise through the press,
radio, television and other media and report it to the enterprise's depart-
ment in charge for filing.
This provision goes some way towards clarifying the true meaning
of the word "guidance" in this context and in so doing, specified Articles
1-1(b) of the Provisions and 2-1 of the Internal Measures which provide
generally that the local labour office have a role in recruitment of staff.
"2 Tianjin Municipality Concerning Cadres of the Chinese Side of Sino-foreign Eq-
uity and Cooperative Joint Ventures (promulgated Mar. 3, 1988), reprinted in CHINA L.
REP., Nov., 1988, at 18.
126 Id. at art. 6.
'2 Wen Wei Po, July 22, 1988, at 18, reprinted in CHINA L. REP., Nov. 1, 1988,
at 13.
'2 Id. at art. 5.
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The Tianjin Measures also significantly limited the type of people
eligible to apply for recruitment. The measures provide:
Apart from those falling under the following categories, all cadres may
apply for recruitment in private joint venture enterprises:
1) Personnel engaged in work closely associated with the Munici-
pality;
2) Personnel working for priority enterprises and work units,
undertaking construction or scientific research, or responsible for
a design project;
3) Primary, middle and high school attendees;
4) Personnel in sectors that lack human resources or those in-
volved in particular types of industries;
5) Personnel who leave their current work voluntarily.
The categories listed under terms (1) and (4) are particularly wide in
scope. This provision is not directly derived from any particular article in
either the Internal Measures or the Provisions. It is rather an example of
specification in accordance with the perceived "spirit" of the 22 Provi-
sions, the Provisions, and the Internal Measures. By way of contrast, the
Guangdong Province Regulatory Provisions Concerning Cadres on the
Chinese Side of Foreign Investment Enterprises (Guangdong Provisions)
do not contain any articles that even remotely resemble the above provi-
sions cited from the Tianjin Measures. Articles 1 through 6 simply
reiterate word-for-word the requirements of the Provisions and the Internal
Measures.
Article 12 of the Tianjin Measures, which further specified Article 3
of the Internal Measures and Article 2 of the Opinion, lays down a pro-
cedure by which people who have been recruited by the joint venture and
who are facing opposition to the transfer from their work unit can tender
their resignation. The Internal Measures do not mention the option of
resignation in these circumstances. They merely provide for a process of
consultation and arbitration involving the local labour department in order
to solve the dispute. The Opinion, however, does provide for the right of
resignation, after which the person concerned may continue to count his
period of employment with the joint venture towards his total length of
service (gongling), a crucial consideration for any prospective employee
as it has direct bearing on the conferral of social security and other
benefits. Thus, specification at the local level is executed in respect to the
relevant provision contained in the lowest and most recent normative
document that has emanated from the centre, even though it may be
merely guifangxing wenjian.
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The matter of resignation is not, however, mentioned by the
Guangdong Provisions, which are characterized by their detailed specifica-
tion of the circumstances under which termination of employment can be
compulsorily or voluntarily effected. 29 With respect to an employee
seeking to resign in order to join a joint venture, the Opinion would
presumedly be applied.
Both Tianjin Measures and Guangdong Provisions, in contrast to the
Provisions and the Internal Measures, specified in almost identical terms
the power of the enterprise to impose sanctions on their employees,
providing that:
The Foreign Investment Enterprise, with the approval of the Board of
Directors and the General Manager, in line with the seriousness of the
case, may impose reasonable sanctions on cadres from the Chinese side
who infringe upon the enterprise's articles of association or its system.
In respect to the sanctions imposed on cadres from the Chinese side, the
trade union of the FIE must be consulted, and an explanation acquired
from the person in question. After making a decision in respect to the
sanction, the enterprise must report it for filing to the supervisory
department of the Chinese joint venture party."3
Significantly, by providing that an explanation be compulsorily
acquired from the person in question, a form of natural justice was intro-
duced into Chinese law which is yet to be instituted at the national level
or recognised by the Administrative Litigation Law.
2. Local Specification of National Foreign Exchange Control
Litigation
The second example of local specification is taken from the area of
foreign exchange control - the Provisions Concerning the Opening of
Deposit Accounts by Enterprises with Foreign Investment, the Control of
Receipts and Payments, and the Control of Statements (Shanghai Provi-
sions),"3 which were formulated and issued by the local exchange con-
trol department and Bank of China branch in Shanghai. These are
'" Provisional Regulations of the Special Economic Zones of Guangdong Province
Governing Labor and Wages for Business Enterprises (promulgated Nov. 17, 1981). An
English translation is available in 2 COMM., Bus. & TRADE LAWS: PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
Op CHINA (Owen D. Nee, Jr. ed., 1991).
"~ Tianjin Measures, art. 22; Guangdong Provisions, art. 15.
... Provisions Concerning the Opening of Deposit Accounts by Enterprises with For-
eign Investment, the Control of Statements, reprinted in E. AsIAN ExEc. REP., Aug. 15,
1988, at 22 [hereinafter Deposit Accounts].
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guifangxing wenjian as they were not approved by the Shanghai People's
Municipal Government. Indicative of their usual role to specifically apply
national legislation to local conditions and reflecting the principles
expressed in the Local Organic Law, its opening sentence reads as
follows:
In accordance with the Regulations of the State on foreign exchange
control and their implementing rules and relevant provisions, taken
together with the circumstances of the Municipality, the following
provisions are made concerning the opening of foreign exchange, foreign
exchange certificate and renminbi deposit accounts by enterprises with
foreign investment at banks (including other financial institutions) as
well as the control of account receipts and payments and the control of
statements.
The Shanghai Provisions specified the Rules for the Implementation
of Foreign Exchange Controls Relating to Overseas Chinese Enterprises,
Foreign Enterprises, and Chinese-Foreign Joint Venture (1983)131 which
in turn were issued to implement Chapter 5 of the Provisional Regula-
tions for Exchange Control of the PRC (1980).11
Various articles of the Shanghai Provisions illustrate how localities
can seem to treat central law merely as a general guideline, feeling free
to impose stricter restrictions of their own or introduce more liberal
provisions in accordance with their understanding of what the "spirit" of
the central legislation may be. For example, in respect to the remittance
of FIE profits, Article 13 of the 1983 Implementing Rules, elaborating on
the requirement in the 1980 Interim Regulations that remittance of the
foreign exchange profits must be approved by the Bank of China, speci-
fied the documentation had to be submitted for approval in order for
permission to be granted to remit overseas. The Shanghai Provisions,
however, extended the scope of the remittance for which approval was
required, laying down that in addition to remittances overseas, approval
of the bank had to be obtained in respect to any transfer of profits out of
the foreign exchange account of the foreign enterprises, including, implic-
itly, transfers of funds to other bank accounts within China for the pur-
pose of use in other domestic projects.13 1
132 Approved by the State Council on July 19, 1983 and issued by the State
Administration of Exchange Control on August 1, 1983 [hereinafter Implementing
Rules].
33 Provisional Regulations for Foreign Exchange Control of the People's Republic
of China (promulgated Dec. 5, 1980). An English transaction is available in WEsTLAW,
Chinalaw database, file no. 0128 [hereinafter Interim Regulations].
" Implementing Rules, supra note 132, at art. ll(A)(2)(1).
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The scope of regulation was similarly increased by the Shanghai
Provisions in respect to remittance of foreign exchange to other branches
of the FIE for the purpose of paying expenses. Article 16 of the 1983
Implementing Rules provided that approval of the SAEC needed to be
obtained only where the FIE sought to transfer foreign exchange to its
branches abroad. Article 11(A)(2)(4) of the Shanghai Provisions extended
the scope of this approval to remittances to branch offices established by
FIEs abroad and in China.
Transfers of foreign exchange by FIEs to banks in China and abroad
were subject to an approval requirement in the Shanghai Implementing
Rules that did not exist in national legislation. National regulations issued
in 1987, the Interim Provisions for Monitoring Statistics on Foreign
Debt '3 require only that loans be registered with the SAEC Sub-Bureau
and that periodic reports on loan activity be submitted.'36 However, the
Shanghai Implementing Rules at Article 11(A)(2)(5) provided that approv-
al was required from the Sub-Bureau for each payment of foreign ex-
change to a foreign bank abroad, the implication being that every time a
payment of interest or principle on a loan was to be made, the approval
of the Sub-Bureau was necessary.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, the Shanghai Implementing
Regulations were actually more lenient in regard to the submission of
various yearly statements in respect to foreign exchange to the SAEC,
allowing one month more than the 1983 Implementing Rules for sub-
mitting some of the required statements. 37
To illustrate how rules at the local level can vary, the Beijing
Municipality Sub-Bureau of the SAEC also issued rules regulating FIE
bank accounts entitled Interim Measures on Foreign Exchange Control of
Enterprises with Foreign Investment. 3 1 These measures mirrored national
legislation in the areas mentioned above, adding no new requirements or
areas that needed approval. As indicated by this example, specification by
localities of national law makes a careful study and comparison of local
rules vital to foreign investors in choosing an investment site.
It is through the multi-layered process of specification that law
gradually loses some of the characteristics that set it apart from policy -
universality, certainty, and consistency, and this is assisted in part by the
oft-cited requirement that local enactments need only be consistent with
'" Interim Measures for Monitoring Statistics on Foreign Debt (promulgated July 17,
1987).
'" Timothy A. Gelatt, Beijing Issues New Measures for Foreign Invested Firms, E.
AsiA ExEC. REP., Oct. 15, 1988, at 8, 11.
' Article lIT.A, C.
' See generally Gelatt, supra note 136, at 8.
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the spirit (jinsheng) rather than the letter of the law. The rationale of
legal flexibility, combined with the resulting broad scope for localities to
specify law, far from encouraging reform in line with legal accountability,
has led to legal implementation being based on the same principles as
policy implementation. It has not been necessary to institute reform at the
local level in order to specifically implement law, for at this level, law
and policy are virtually indistinguishable. They are virtually two sides of
the same coin. As a result, many local administrative bodies which lack
lawmaking power (counties, townships, cities) have granted themselves
virtually unlimited powers of office through the enactment of xingzheng
cuoshi39 - so many in fact that legal regulation at this level has been
described by one Chinese legal scholar as being in "a state of total disar-
ray.,,4
Legal implementation, therefore, mirrors policy implementation. Law
is implemented in the same way as policy has been implemented tradi-
tionally, that is, in the manner of law by decree. The consequence is that
although law on the surface may look ostensibly Western and familiar, it
loses these familiar characteristics in the course of specification. 141 Poli-
cy has traditionally involved a great amount of discretion in being
retained at the local level by implementing authorities. In China, laws
share this characteristic. Local bodies are given the power to draft the
rules that they please within certain vaguely specified limits as broad laws
leave them with the responsibility of filling in the detail. The system that
the legal system was supposed to replace, that of normative determination
through policy decree, therefore continues under the guise of the rule of
law - at the cost of universality, predictability, consistency, and ultimate-
ly, in some cases, investor confidence.
IV. ADMINISTRATVE INTERPRETATION
We have discussed how administrative bodies, through administrative
specification, seek to adjust law to reality. Administrative authorities with
lawmaking power have another device through which they can construe
law and regulations in a way that reflects departmental policy and/or the
social reality of the regulated. This device is known as administrative
interpretation. 42
,3 Zhuang, supra note 72, at 10. Zhao, supra note 78. In Chinese this phenomenon
is expressed as being yueding sucheng - accepted through common practice.
" Zhuang, supra note 72, at 10.
141 Imported Western legal concepts are often "tested" at the local level first, as has
been the case in Shenzhen. At the testing stage, "alien" legal concepts may be less
prone to dilution through specification as fewer levels of specification exist than would
be the case for a national law.
142 Chinese legal theorists distinguish between formal and informal interpretation.
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Administrative interpretation is not only the most important mode of
legal interpretation in the PRC, it is in effect an authoritative supplement
and accretion to legislation. "Indeed, the principle of jurisprudence adopt-
ed in the PRC is that only the enacting body or its representative or
controlling organ is competent to interpret any piece of legislation in a
manner that is generally binding."143 The State Council, its subordinate
ministries and departments have the authority to make interpretations in
regard to the specific application of administrative rules and regulations
not subject to judicial and procuratorial work.'" Similarly, responsible
departments under local people's governments are charged with making
interpretations concerning the specific application of laws and regulations
of a local character. 45
Express authority for an administrative body to interpret a certain
piece of legislation is normally conferred in the regulation itself. The
methods by which such interpretations are issued are not specified. The
same administrative bodies are usually responsible for the implementation
of the law or regulation and are usually the original drafters. Each
ministry and commission has personnel responsible for drafting laws and
before a bill is proposed by the State Council, a draft version is prepared
by the relevant subordinate unit.'" It is not surprising, therefore, that
such bodies ensure that they are allocated as much discretion as possible,
which allows them to define their position through interpretation or
change position through reinterpretation where necessary.
Administrative interpretation takes its form in various types of
documentation and is issued to explain xingzheng fagui or guizhang. Such
interpretations are considered as "abstract administrative acts"'47 with
Informal interpretations, which appear in scholarly writings, are not binding and lose
their persuasive effect if a formal interpretation has been issued on the same point.
Formal interpretations are made by state organs and have binding legal force. Formal
interpretation in turn can be separated into legislative, judicial, and administrative
interpretation; administrative interpretation and legislative interpretations being accepted
sources of administrative law in the PRC. Our focus will be on administrative in-
terpretation. TAO-TAI HsIA & CONSTANCE JOHNSON, LAW MAKING IN THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHiNA: TERMS, PROCEDURES, HIERARCHY AND INT.ERPRETATION 20 (1986).
" Joseph Y.S. Cheng, The Constitutional Relationship Between the Central Govern-
ment and the Future Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, 20 CASE
W. RES. J. INT'L L. 65, 79 (1988).
'" Resolution of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress Provid-
ing an Improved Interpretation of the Law, Item 3 (1981). An English translation is
available in WESTLAw, China Database, File no. 0029.
'45 Id. at Item 4.
" Tao-tai Hsia & Constance A. Johnson, Lawmaking in China, Part IV, E. ASIAN
ExEC. REP., Aug. 15, 1987, at 9-10.
'1 "Abstract administrative acts" refers to instruments passed by administrative
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legal status equal to that of the instrument that they are interpreting.
Documents are issued in the form of Circulars and contain the name
jieshi (interpretation) or shuoming (explanation) in their title. Interpreta-
tions or explanations are often issued at the request of local administrative
organs. Examples of such documents are MOFERT Circular in Respect to
its Interpretation of Articles 71 and 74 of the Equity Joint Venture Law
Implementing Regulations [(85) Waijinmaofazi No. 34]"' and [(85)
Waijinmaofazi No. 30],149 issued pursuant to MOFERT's right of inter-
pretation under Article 117 of the Equity Joint Venture Implementing
Regulations. A further example is the Reply by the SAIC Registration
Section in Respect to Request for Interpretation of Article 5 of the
Provisional Provisions on the Percentage of Registered Capital and Total
Investment [Qiwaizi (1987) No. 54].1"'
A further example of administrative interpretation is the State Eco-
nomic Commission' Explanation in Respect to Method of Implementa-
tion of Article 5 of the Mechanical and Electrical Product Importation
Substitution Management Measures Concerning Sino-foreign Equity and
Cooperative Joint Ventures (Explanation), released in October, 1987, pur-
suant to the power of interpretation that the State Economic Commission
accorded to itself under Article 8 of the State Economic Commission
Management Measures Concerning Mechanical and Electrical Product
Importation Substitution of Sino-foreign Equity and Cooperative Joint
Ventures (Management Measures)12 to clarify the State Economic
Commission's position in respect to Article 5 which provided:
Customers who need listed products (on mechanical and electrical
import substitute products lists) should order them through (local) manu-
facturers or submit bids through the China Mechanical and Electrical
Facility Tendering Centre (or through tender companies or centres ap-
authorities that are generally applicable to numerous situations. "Specific administrative
acts," which are reviewable by the courts and administrative organs, are administrative
acts which are not universal in nature and aimed at a specific target. ALBERT H.Y.
CHEN, AN INTRODUCrION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CmNA 204 (1992).
" Foreign Economic Relations, supra note 75, at 75.
,49 ld. at 78.
0 Id. at 19.
"S Note that the State Economic Commission is now defunct, having been recently
abolished and its functions reallocated to other administrative departments under the
State Council.
" State Economic Commission Management Measures Concerning Mechanical and
Electrical Product Importation Substitution of Sino-foreign Equity and Cooperative Joint
Ventures (1987). Foreign Economic Relations, supra note 75, at 24.
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proved by the State Economic Commission) in order to direct customers
to choose their goods locally as import substitutes.' (italicised words
added)
The purpose of this provision was to direct joint ventures to pur-
chase products produced by domestic enterprises approved as suitable to
replace products imported from overseas.
The Explanation provided that:
Any good listed in a nation import substitution list will be regulated in
accordance with Guofa (1985) No. 90 and the State Economic Commis-
sion Circular Concerning Further Control of Mechanical and Electrical
Products Importation Reports [Jinglin (1986) No. 302, issued by the
State Economic Commission with State Council approval]. Under state
controlled mechanical and electrical product importation (note some are
controlled at the local level, e.g. elevators), that is to say, listed prod-
ucts should not be imported in principal. If certain special reasons exist
to justify importation, one should first tender for goods locally in accor-
dance with the requirements of the China Mechanical and Electrical
Products Facility Tendering Centre. If the need for the goods cannot be
satisfied locally through tender, then importation will be permitted.
However, in this situation one is not entitled to the relevant preferential
tariff deductions; if one has imported listed mechanical or electrical
products at one's own accord without bidding, he is not entitled to
preferential tax deductions (and the usual import duty), will be levied
with the import adjustment tax. (italicised words added)
It is significant that although the Management Measures were
formally issued, both the Explanation and one of the documents that it
refers to, Document No. 90, were not. This illustrates two features of
administrative interpretation. First, it perpetuates a situation in which legal
transparency is absent. Article 5 on its face gives no indication that it is
intended that Document No. 90 is to continue to be applied. Indeed, as
both the Explanation and Document No. 90 are not issued, it is virtually
impossible for the regulated parties to make any sense of the patterns of
implementation of Article 5, which, typically, is short on detail and long
on principle.
Second, the fact that the Explanation refers to Document No. 90,
arguably guifangxing wenfian on account of its nature as an unissued
document, indicates the methods that administrative departments employ
in order to perpetuate the efficacy of unpublished documents as the true
basis of regulation. Document No. 90 was formulated in 1984. Rather
153 Id. at 25.
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than specifying the content of Document No. 90 within the body of the
Management Measures, the department favoured perpetuating its status as
an informal, hidden document, indicating the departmental policy of
retaining as much flexibility as possible to issue lower level documents
as the true determinants of regulatory norms.
On its face, Article 5 of the Management Measures makes no
suggestion that product types that are listed as import substitutes can be
imported from overseas. However, the Explanation qualifies this by
stating that although listed products should not be imported in principle,
that one may actually do so if one fulfills certain conditions, the sanction
being that one will incur significant extra tariffs if one chooses to take
this course of action. Thus, the Explanation has the effect of softening
Article 5 at the expense of legal certainty, as, needless to say, the depart-
ment empowered with the right of interpretation may at any time alter a
previous interpretation by issuing a new one depending on changes in
departmental or CCP policy.
Occasionally administrative agencies go too far with their administra-
tive interpretations. A case in point is Article 3 of the Explanation of
Various Problems of the Public Security Bureau's Implementation of the
Regulations of the PRC on Administrative Penalties for Public Security
(PSB Explanation), which interpreted Article 39 of the Regulations of the
PRC on Administrative Penalties for Public Security (1986).' Article
39 provided:
If an offender or victim protests the ruling of the public security organ
or the people's governments of townships or towns, he may petition the
public security organ, at the next higher level within five days after
receiving the notice, the public security organs at the next higher level
shall make a new ruling within five days after receiving the petition.
Whoever protests the ruling of the public security organ at the next
higher level may file suit with the local people's court within five days
after the notice.'55
However, Article 3 of the PSB Explanation stated that:
If an offender or victim protests the ruling of the public security organ
in regard to compensation or medical damages, he may petition the
,' Laws and Regulations of the PRC on Administrative Penalties for Public Security,
art. 39 (promulgated Sept. 5, 1986). An English translation is available in WEsTiAw,
Chinalaw database, and in the Legislative Affairs Commission of the Standing Commit-
tee of the NPC, The Laws of the PRC, 1983-1986 (1989), 271.
' Translation from the Legislative Affairs Commision of the Standing Committee
of the NPC, supra note 154.
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public security organs at the next higher level within two days after
receiving the notice of the initial decision and that the decision of the
superior organ is final and conclusive.
In a case before the administrative bench of the Xingyang District
Intermediate Court, the court declined to apply the Explanation as they
considered that the PSB Explanation narrowed down the actionable rights
conferred by the Regulations in two obvious respects - that the time
period within which appeal must be made was reduced from five to two
days, and that appeal to the people's court was precluded. This, however,
is some indication of how administrative agencies have at times abused
their right to issue interpretations, a danger implicit in a system which
allows formal powers of rule making, interpretation, and enforcement to
lie in the same body.
V. CONCLUSION
The Chinese have adopted a rationale that lends itself to the creation
of law that is broad and inherently flexible. Laws are characterised by
features, namely principle-like pronouncements, vagueness and ambiguity,
broadly worded discretions, undefined terms, omissions, and general
catch-all phrases, that assist flexibility in the issuing of lower implement-
ing documents. Administrative bodies have two techniques at their
disposal to introduce specificity. These are administrative specification and
administrative interpretation. Through such devises, laws are "adjusted" in
ways that best suit the implementing agency. It has also been shown that
this process occurs at the level of local government. Even local govern-
ments that lack formal lawmaking power have the power to specify law,
by issuing "administrative measures," to adjust the content of legal norms
to "suit local conditions."
The end result is that law is treated as only a flexible guideline that
sets the parameters within which administrative discretionary lawmaking
authority can be practised. Administrative organs thus are free to rein-
terpret law as they see fit, either to reflect departmental policy or to
reflect the conditions of local reality. The authority to specify and inter-
pret law is thus the source of enormous power, power that can be easily
abused and which administrative organs are anxious to protect.
Foreign-funded enterprises in China should therefore not take the
letter of higher law for granted - they would be well-advised to access,
where possible, the relevant rules, interpretations, and circulars. Only then
will legal regulation begin to take on some transparency. They should
expect reinterpretation of laws in accordance with shifts in policy at both
the national and local levels. Above all, they must be prepared to show
ingenuity - for the only effective way to contend with legal flexibility is
to be even more flexible in response.
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